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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Journal of Contemporary Law. - Note,
Alquijay v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital: The

Inequitable Umbrella of Wrongful Life, 12 J.
Contemp. L. 137 (1986).

CHAPTER 12
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
Section
78-12-1.

Time for commencement of actions generally.

Article 1

78-12-19.
78-12-20.

Real Property
Actions by the state.
Actions by patentees or grantees
from state.
When letters patent or grants de78-12-4.
clared void.
Seizure or possession within seven
78-12-5.
years necessary.
78-12-5.1. Seizure or possession within
seven years - Proviso - Tax
title.
78-12-5.2. Holder of tax title - Limitations
of action or defense - Proviso.
78-12-5.3. Definitions of "tax title" and "action."
Actions or defenses founded upon
78-12-6.
title to real estate.
Adverse possession - Possession
78-12-7.
presumed in owner.
78-12-7.1. Adverse possession - Presumption - Proviso - Tax title.
Under written instrument or judg78-12-8.
ment.
What constitutes adverse posses78-12-9.
sion under written instrument.
78-12-10.
Under claim not founded on written instrument or judgment.
78-12-11.
What constitutes adverse possession not under written instrument.
78-12-12.
Possession must be continuous,
and taxes paid.
78-12-12.1. Possession and payment of taxes
- Proviso - Tax title.
78-12-13.
Adverse possession of public
streets or ways.
78-12-14.
Possession of tenant deemed possession of landlord.
78-12-15.
Possession not affected by descent
cast.
78-12-16.
Action to redeem mortgage of real
property.
78-12-17.
Redemption when more than one
mortgagor.
78-12-2.
78-12-3.

Section
78-12-18.

78-12-21.

Actions to recover estate sold by
guardian.
Actions to recover estate sold by
executor or administrator.
Minority or disability prevents
running of period.
Disabilities enumerated - Time
of not reckoned.

Article 2
Other Than Real Property
78-12-22.
Within eight years.
78-12-23.
Within six years - Mesne profits
of real property - Instrument
in writing - Distribution of
criminal proceeds to victim.
78-12-24.
Actions against public officers Within six years.
78-12-25.
Within four years.
78-12-25.5. Injury due to defective design or
construction of improvement to
real property - Within seven
years.
78-12-26.
Within three years.
78-12-27.
Action against corporate stockholders or directors.
78-12-28.
Within two years.
78-12-29.
Within one year.
78-12-30.
Actions on claims against county,
city or town.
78-12-31.
Within six months.
78-12-31.1. Habeas corpus - Three months.
78-12-31.2. Post-conviction remedies - 30
days.
78-12-32.
Action on mutual account
When deemed accrued.
78-12-33.
Actions by state.
78-12-34.
Repealed.
Article 3
Miscellaneous Provisions
78-12-35.
Effect of absence from state.
78-12-36.
Effect of disability.
78-12-37.
Effect of death.
78-12-38.
Effect of death of defendant outside this state.
78-12-39.
Effect of war.
78-12-40.
Effect of failure of action not on
merits.
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Section
78-12-41.
78-12-42.
78-12-43.
78-12-44.

78-12-1.

Effect of injunction or prohibition.
Disability must exist when right
of action accrues.
All disabilities must be removed.
Effect of payment, acknowledgment, or promise to pay.

Section
78-12-45.
78-12-46.
78-12-47.

Time for commencement

78-12-1

Action barred in another state
barred here.
"Action" includes special proceeding.
Separate trial of statute of limitations issue in malpractice actions.

of actions generally.

Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods prescribed in this
chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, except in specific cases where a
different limitation is prescribed by statute.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-1; 1987, ch. 19, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment substituted "may" for "can" near the beginning of the section and substituted "has accrued except in specific cases where" for "shall
have accrued except where in special cases".
Compiler's Notes. - Laws 1987, ch. 19, § 6
provides that the 1987 amendment to this section applies only to causes of action that arise
after April 27, 1987 and has no retroactive application.
.
Cross-References. - Affirmative defense,
statute of limitations as, Rule 8(c), U.R.C.P.
Antitrust Act actions, § 76-10-925.
Cities and towns, claims and actions against,
§§ 11-14-21, 63-30-13, 63-30-15, 78-12-29,
78-12-30.
Collection agency bond, actions on, § 12-1-3.
Common carriers, claims and actions for loss
or damage to freight, § 54-3-16.
Contracts for sale of goods, § 70A-2-725.
Counties, claims and actions against,
§§ 17-15-10, 17-15-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-15,
78-12-30.
County service areas, legality of bonds and
proceedings, § 17-29-28.

County water and sewer districts, §§ 17-6-3,
17-6-3.11.
Governmental Immunity Act, § 63-30-1 et
seq.
Improvement district proceedings, § 10-1628.
Insurance
contracts,
actions
on,
§ 31A-21-313.
Metropolitan . water districts, §§ 73-8-17,
73-8-30.
Marketable record titles, § 57-9-1 et seq.
Municipal bond proceedings, § 11-14-21.
Pleading statute of limitations, Rule 9(h),
U.R.C.P.
Product Liability Act, statute of limitations,
§ 78-15-3.
Protest of solicitation or award of public contract, § 63-56-55.
Public works programs, contesting ordinances and bonds, § 55-3-16.
Redevelopment plans and projects,§§ 11-15117, 11-19-20, 11-19-23.7.
Securities Act, §§ 61-1-4, 61-1-22.
State,
actions
against,
§§ 63-30-12,
63-30-15.
Water conservancy district bonds,§ 73-9-31.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Escheat proceedings.
-Applicable foreign law.
Nature and extent of right.
-Legal.
-Renewal of barred action.
-Vested.
Trust estate.
Waiver.
-Failure to plead.
When statute begins to run.
-Commencement of another action.
-Existence of cause of action.
-Particular
proceedings.
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-Relation back.
--Amendment
to complaint.
-Remediability
of claim.
-Service of summons.

Escheat proceedings.
-Applicable
foreign law.
Five-year limitation period within which
heirs must claim estate to prevent its escheat
after death of intestate without apparent heirs
is subject to provisions of treaty between
United States and country of alien intestate,
requiring actual notice to consular authorities
of intestate's death without apparent heirs. In
re Apostolopoulos' Estate, 68 Utah 344, 250 P.
469, 253 P. 1117, 48 A.L.R. 1322 (1926).
Nature and extent of right.
-Legal.
The statute oflimitations governs legal title,
rights and demands; !aches apply to equitable
demands. Fisher v. Davis, 77 Utah 81, 291 P.
493 (1930). See Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 116,
148 P. 1096 (1915); Smith v. Smith, 77 Utah
60, 291 P. 298 (1930).
Statute of limitations is legal rather than
equitable defense, and hence may be interposed as defense regardless of equities. Passey
v. Budge, 85 Utah 37, 38 P.2d 712 (1934).
-Renewal
of barred action.
Legislative act, which lengthened period of
limitation, cannot operate to renew cause of
action already barred. Ireland v. Mackintosh,
22 Utah 296, 61 P. 901 (1900). For comment
unfavorable to result reached in this case, see
14 Harv. L. Rev., p. 229.
-Vested.
The right to interpose bar of statute of limitations as defense, once such right has accrued,
is vested right which cannot be taken away by
legislative enactment. Ireland v. Mackintosh,
22 Utah 296, 61 P. 901 (1900). For comment
unfavorable to result reached in this case, see
14 Harv. L. Rev., p. 229.
Where the time has fully run, the right to
invoke the statute constitutes a vested right.
O'Donnell v. Parker, 48 Utah 578, 160 P. 1192
(1916).
Trust estate.
Rule that statute of limitations does not bar
trust estate applies only as between cestui que
trust and trustee, and does not apply as between cestui que trust and trustee on one side
and strangers on other side. Jenkins v. Jensen,
24 Utah 108, 66 P. 773 (1901).
Waiver.
-Failure to plead.
Bar of statute is waived unless pleaded. Ireland v. Mackintosh, 22 Utah 296, 61 P. 901
(1900). For comment unfavorable to result

reached in this case, see 14 Harv. L. Rev., p.
229.

When statute begins to run.
-Commencement
of another action.
Commencement of another action prior to
the action that is barred does not remove the
bar, if such action was on a different cause, or
was commenced after statute had run. Woolfv.
Gray, 48 Utah 239, 158 P. 788 (1916).
-Existence
of cause of action.
Statutes of limitation do not begin to run
until a suit or cause of action exists. Kimball v.
McCornick, 70 Utah 189, 259 P. 313 (1927).
-Particular
proceedings.
Ordinarily a cause of action for a debt begins
to run when a debt is due and payable, but
when some controlling statute or contract between the parties provides that an additional
thing be done before any action may be
brought (such as a statutory provision that a
return must be filed), the statute does not start
to run until the time when suit may be maintained even though interest on the amount of
liability may begin to run from the time it is
due and payable. State Tax Comm'n v. Spanish
Fork, 99 Utah 177, 100 P.2d 575, 131 A.L.R.
816 (1940).
Right of action on deficiency judgment entered after foreclosure sale accrued at date
amount of deficiency was ascertained, and not
at time decree of foreclosure was made. Howe
v. Sears, 30 Utah 344, 84 P. 1107 (1906).
Statute of limitations on action for breach of
contract ordinarily begins to run when the
breach occurs and not when the damage is ascertained. M.H. Walker Realty Co. v. American Sur. Co., 60 Utah 435, 211 P. 998 (1922).
In action for breach of warranty for quiet
enjoyment, statute begins to run from time of
actual eviction; it is otherwise as to constructive eviction. East Canyon Land & Stock Co. v.
Davis & Weber Counties Canal Co., 65 Utah
560, 238 P. 280 (1925).
In action for breach of warranty as to quality
of goods sold, statute does not begin to run
until there is a sale of the article warranted.
M.H. Walker Realty Co. v. American Sur. Co.,
60 Utah 435, 211 P. 998 (1922).
Mere fact that a partnership is dissolved
does not necessarily immediately give either of
the parties a cause of action against the other.
Kimball v. McCornick, 70 Utah 189, 259 P. 313
(1927).
On insolvency of building and loan association and appointment of receiver to wind up
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affairs, mortgage indebtedness of borrowing
members became immediately due and collectible by receiver, and statute of limitations
began to run against mortgage from that time.
Graves v. Seifried, 31 Utah 203, 87 P. 674
(1906).
In case of express or direct trust, statute of
limitations does not operate, as between
trustee and cestui que trust, so long as such
trust continues, but when trustee denies trust
and assumes ownership of trust property, or
denies liability or obligation under trust relation, in such manner that cestui que trust has
either actual or constructive notice of repudiation of trust, statute attaches and begins to run
from that time, since such denial or adverse
claim is abandonment of fiduciary character in
which trustee has stood in relation to trust
property. Thomas v. Glendinning, 13 Utah 47,
44 P. 652 (1896).
-Relation back.
--Amendment
to complaint.
Amendment to. complaint, consisting of in-

78-12-2

terlineation whereby complaint was made to
refer to copy of written instrument annexed to
it, instead of to original, held to have related
back to time of filing of complaint. Billings v.
Parsons, 17 Utah 22, 53 P. 730 (1898).

-Remediability
of claim.
General rule is that. cause of action accrues
at time it becomes remediable in the courts;
that is, when the claim is in such condition
that the courts can proceed and give judgment
if the claim is established. State Tax Comm'n
v. Spanish Fork, 99 Utah 177, 100 P.2d 575,
131 A.L.R. 816 (1940).
-Service of summons.
Under former statutes, held that, where
complaint was filed within period of limitations, action was not barred, notwithstanding
summons was not served until after such period had expired. Keyser v. Pollock, 20 Utah
371, 59 P. 87 (1899).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Brigham Young Law Review. - Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 937, 945.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 9 et seq.
C.J.S. - 53 C.J.S. Limitation of Actions§ 1
et seq.
A.L.R. - Validity of contractual time period, shorter than statute of limitations, for
bringing action, 6 A.L.R.3d 1197.
Settlement negotiations as estopping reliance on statute of limitations, 39 A.L.R.3d 127.
Agreement of parties as estopping reliance
on statute of limitations, 43 A.L.R.3d 756.
Promises to settle or perform as estopping
reliance on statute of limitations, 44 A.L.R.3d
482.
Plaintiffs diligence as affecting his right to
have defendant estopped from pleading the
statute of limitations, 44 A.L.R.3d 760.

Fiduciary or confidential relationship as affecting estoppel to plead statute of limitations,
45 A.L.R.3d 630.
Delay caused by other litigation as estopping
reliance on statute of limitations, 45 A.L.R.3d
703.
What statute of limitations applies to action
for contribution against joint tortfeasor, or action for indemnity, 57 A.L.R.3d 927.
What statute of limitations governs action
for interference with contract or other economic relations, 58 A.L.R.3d 1027.
What statute of limitations applies to action
for surplus of proceeds, from sale of collateral,
59 A.L.R.3d 1205; 16 A.L.R.4th 1335.
Extensions of time under § 108(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code (11 USCS § 108(a)), 80
A.L.R. Fed. 374.
Key Numbers. - Limitation of Actions ea, 1
et seq.

ARTICLE 1
REAL PROPERTY
78-12-2.

Actions by the state.

The state will not
the issues or profits
same, unless:
(1) such right
action or other

sue any person for or in respect to any real property, or
thereof, by reason of the right or title of the state to the
or title shall have accrued within seven years before any
proceeding for the same shall be commenced; or
231
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(2) the state or those from whom it claims shall have received the rents
and profits of such real property, or some part thereof, within seven years.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-2.

Cross-References. - State control of public
land, Chapter 11 of Title 65.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
School land.
-Required
use.
Board of education may lose by adverse possession title to property that is not used for

school purposes, but is held for sale as business
property. Pioneer Inv. & Trust Co. v. Board of
Educ., 35 Utah 1, 99 P. 150, 136 Am. St. R.
1016 (1909).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions §§ 84, 416.
C.J.S. - 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 15.•

78-12-3.

Key Numbers. 11(1).

Actions by patentees

Limitation of Actions

€=>

or grantees from state.

No action can be brought for or in respect to real property by any person
claiming under letters patent or a grant from this state, unless the same
might have been commenced by the state as herein specified, in case such
patent had not been issued or grant made.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-3.

Cross-References. - Land grants, Chapters 3 and 4 of Title 65.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
United States from date of issuance of the
patent, and not from date of final payment for
the land. Steele v. Boley, 7 Utah 64, 24 P. 755
(1890).

Patentees.
-When statute begins to run.
The statute of limitations begins to run
against the patentee of public lands from the

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. Lands § 130.

78-12-4.

C.J.S. - 73B C.J.S. Public Lands § 185.
Key Numbers. - Public Lands e=> 114, 181.

63A Am. Jur. 2d Public

When letters patent or grants declared void.

When letters patent or grants of real property issued or made by the state
are declared void by the determination of a competent court, an action for the
recovery of the property so conveyed may be brought either by the state, or by
any subsequent patentee or grantee of the property, his heirs or assigns,
within seven years after such determination, but not after that period.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-4.

Cross-References. - Land grants, Chapters 3 and 4 of Title 65.
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78-12-5

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Key Numbers. - Public Lands
122, 181.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 63A Am. Jur. 2d Public
Lands § 82 et seq.
C.J.S. - 73B C.J.S. Public Lands § 193.

78-12-5.

Seizure or possession
sary.

119, 121,

<l:=>

within seven years neces-

No action for the recovery of real property or for the possession thereof shall
be maintained, unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, grantor or
predecessor was seized or possessed of the property in question within seven
years before the commencement of the action.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-5.
Compiler's Notes. - This section is similar
to § 104-2-5 (Code 1943) which was repealed
by Laws 195i, ch. 58, § 3. Section 104-2-5 was
amended by Laws 1951, ch. 19, § l; that provi-

sion is compiled as§ 78-12-5.1 herein. The Supreme Court held the amendment was valid
despite the repeal of § 104-2-5.
Cross-References. - Marketable record title, § 57-9-1 et seq.
Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Adverse possession.
-Defective tax title.
-Federal land.
-Possession and payment of taxes.
-Required elements.
-Sufficient actions.
Applicability of section.
-Fraud or mistake.
-Rights of way and prescriptive rights.
Constructive possession.
-Purchase
and deed.
Joint possession.
-Husband and wife.
Judgment on pleadings.
-Denial.
Laches.
-Applicability.
Mortgage foreclosure decree.
-Collateral
attack.
Tacking possessions.
-Privity.
Waiver or loss of right to plead statute.
-Fraud.
When action brought.
-Action by minor.

Adverse possession.
-Defective tax title.
It is well settled in this state that a person
holding property under a defective tax title for
a period of seven years is doing so adversely to
the claim of ownership to such property by the
delinquent tax debtor owner. Valley Inv. Co. v.

Los Angeles & S.L.R.R., 119 Utah 169, 225
P.2d 722 (1950).

-Federal land.
Adverse possession cannot be claimed in
land where title is traced back to the United
States, unless title has been out of the govern-
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ment for the full period. Utah Copper Co. v.
Eckman, 47 Utah 165, 152 P. 178 (1915).

-Possession
and payment of taxes.
Possession of the land adverse to the legal
owner, and payment of the taxes thereon for a
period of about four years before suit to quiet
title instituted, is not the adverse possession
contemplated by this section. Keller v.
Chournos, 102 Utah 535, 133 P.2d 318 (1943).
-Required
elements.
If son as grantee of life estate and his wife as
receiver thereof have held open, notorious, continuous and adverse possession of land in dispute for more than seven years preceding commencement of the action, plaintiffs action is
barred. Wells v. Wells, 7 Utah 68, 24 P. 752
(1890).
It was not error to dismiss complaint in action to quiet title, where the evidence clearly
showed a continuous open, hostile and adverse
possession by defendant and his predecessors
in interest for a period of more than seven
years before appellant commenced her action.
Bozievich v. Slechta, 109 Utah 373, 166 P.2d
239 (1946).
-Sufficient
actions.
Open, exclusive and notorious possession of
property in question for more than fifteen
years before commencement of the action, erection of improvements, a fence, payment of
taxes, etc., gives title by adverse possession.
Houghton v. Barton, 49 Utah 611, 165 P. 471
(1917).
Plaintiff acquired title by adverse possession
where it enclosed land with fence, built improvements, created artificial lake, paid taxes,
grazed land and conducted commercial enterprise thereon for seven consecutive years and
defendant never attempted to assert possession. Falconaero Enter., Inc. v. Valley Inv. Co.,
16 Utah 2d 77, 395 P.2d 915 (1964).
Applicability

of section.

-Fraud or mistake.
Grantor not in possession, who sought to
quiet title to land which required cancellation
of deed on ground of fraud or mistake, held
barred by three-year statute of limitation provided by predecessor to § 78-12-26, as against
contention that it was controlled by the sevenyear limitation period of predecessor to this
section. Davidsen v. City of Salt Lake, 95 Utah
347, 81 P.2d 374, 118 A.L.R. 195 (1938).
-Rights of way and prescriptive rights.
This section does not apply to rights of way
or any other class of easements by prescription.
The right by prescription can only arise by adverse use and enjoyment under claim of right
uninterrupted and continuous for a period of
twenty years. Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243,
161 P. 1127 (1916).

Constructive possession.
-Purchase
and deed.
Under this section, where plaintiff purchased vacant and unimproved land at foreclosure sale, receiving a deed therefor, the law
presumes that he was in constructive possession and entitled to actual possession in absence of evidence to the contrary; therefore defendant's possession and seizure ofland for two
or three years prior to commencement of an
action is not a bar. Ives v. Grange, 42 Utah
608,134 P. 619 (1913).
Joint possession.
-Husband and wife.
Where husband and wife lived together in
mutual confidence of marriage relation, and
husband purchased property, title thereto being taken in name of wife, possession of wife
and husband was joint, and statute of limitations did not run to prevent husband from having property regarded as being held in trust for
him. Anderson v. Cercone, 54 Utah 345, 180 P.
586 (1919).
Judgment on pleadings.
-Denial.
In action to quiet title, trial court properly
denied plaintiffs motion for judgment on the
pleadings by reason of plea where third
amended complaint showed on its face that defendants were then in possession of at least
some portion of the premises under a claim of
right and were collecting the rents, issues and
profits. Pender v. Bird, 119 Utah 91, 224 P.2d
1057 (1950).
Laches.
-Applicability.
If, in action to quiet title, statute of limitations has not run or adverse possession established, defense of laches will not be allowed;
!aches apply to equitable demands. Fisher v.
Davis, 77 Utah 81, 291 P. 493 (1930).
Mortgage foreclosure decree.
-Collateral attack.
Mortgage foreclosure decree could not be collaterally attacked for mortgagee's failure to
serve proper representative of estate of deceased mortgagor, where defendants in that action defaulted, no appeal was taken and foreclosure decree had become final, and where
foreclosure record did not show such error or
defect on its face, and this section afforded no
defense to subsequent action to quiet title instituted by mortgagee who purchased at foreclosure sale. Zion's Benefit Bldg. Soc'y v.
Geary, 112 Utah 548, 189 P.2d 964 (1948).
Tacking possessions.
-Privity.
There must be privity between persons sue-
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cessively holding adversely in order to tack the
possession of a predecessor in possession to
that of his successor. Numerous cases hold that
a deed does not in and of itself create any privity between grantor and grantee as to land not
described in the deed, although occupied by the
grantor in connection therewith, even if the
grantee enters into possession of the adjoining
area claimed to be held adversely by his
grantor and the grantee uses such land in. connection with the land actually conveyed. Home
Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208,
141 P.2d 160 (1943).
Waiver or loss of right to plead statute.

-Fraud.
Where husband commenced action to have
property which was held in wife's name regarded as being held in trust for him, while
wife's divorce proceeding was pending against
him, and spouses entered into agreement that

78-12-5.1

if husband would dismiss his suit to recover
property, wife would dismiss her action for divorce, and in pursuance of this agreement, husband dismissed his suit but wife prosecuted her
action to final decree, her conduct constituted
palpable fraud and her plea of statute of limitation could not prevail in subsequent suit by
husband. Anderson v. Cercone, 54 Utah 345,
180 P. 586 (1919).

When action brought.
-Action by minor.
Action by minor within two years after he
had attained majority, to recover real estate,
was not barred although administrator was not
discharged, since rule that heirs are barred
where administrator is barred was inapplicable, property being distributed to minor under
§ 75-12-8 (since repealed). Robbins v. Duggins,
61 Utah 542, 216 P. 232 (1923).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Journal of Energy Law and Policy. - A
primer of Utah Water Law, 5 J. Energy L. &
Pol'y 165 (1984).
Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 84 et seq.
C.J.S. - 53 C.J.S. Limitation of Actions
§ 34 et seq.

78-12-5.1.

A.L.R. - When does cause of action accrue,
for purposes of statute of limitations, against
action based upon encroachment of building or
other structure upon land of another, 12
A.L.R.3d 1265.
Key Numbers. - Limitation of Actions <S=>
19(1).

Seizure or possession within seven yearsviso - Tax title.

Pro-

No action for the recovery of real property or for the possession thereof shall
be maintained, unless the plaintiff or his predecessor was seized or possessed
of such property within seven years from the commencement of such action;
provided, however, that with respect to actions or defenses brought or interposed for the recovery or possession of or to quiet title or determine the ownership of real property against the holder of a tax title to such property, no such
action or defense shall be commenced or interposed more than four years after
the date of the tax deed, conveyance, or transfer creating such tax title unless
the person commencing or interposing such action or defense or his predecessor has actually occupied or been in possession of such property within four
years prior to the commencement or interposition of such action or defense or
within one year from the effective date of this amendment.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2859;
C.L. 1917, § 6449; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
104-2-5; L. 1943, ch. 18, § l; 1951, ch. 19, § 1.
Compiler's Notes. - This section reflects
the amendment by Laws 1951, ch. 19, § 1 to
§ 104-2-5 (Code 1943). Although § 104-2-5 was
repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3, the Supreme Court held that Laws 1951, ch. 19 was
not repealed. Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 1 enacted

the successor to § 104-2-5, now compiled as
§ 78-12-5. See Notes to Decisions, below.
The term "effective date of this amendment"
referred to in this section, means the effective
date of Laws 1951, Chapter 19, i.e., May 8,
1951.
Cross-References. - Marketable record title, § 57-9-1 et seq.
Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq.
Tax sales, § 59-10-29 et seq.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Actual occupancy or possession by record title holder.
-Not required.
-Required.
Adverse possession requirements.
Claims barred.
-Lack of possession.
Construction and application of section.
Invalid tax title.
"Tax title".
-Cotenants.
-Former record titleholders.
Validity of section.

Actual occupancy or possession by record
title holder.
-Not required.
The failure of record title holders to show
possession or occupation of property is not sufficient to bar their defense to a quiet title action where the tax title claimants have no
valid claim, since this section and § 78-12-5.2
are intended to bar the right of a party to recover property only where the opposing party
establishes a right of possession or ownership
in the property. Lyman v. National Mtg. Bond
Corp., 7 Utah 2d 123, 320 P.2d 322 (1958).
-Required.
The statutory presumption created by
§ 78-12-7.1, that the legal title holder is presumed to be in possession, does not satisfy this
section's requirement of actual occupancy or
possession and does not toll the running of the
special statute of limitations for tax titles.
Fredericksen v. LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827 (Utah
1981).
Adverse possession requirements.
Tax title holder may raise as a defense the
statute of limitations provided in this section
for tax titles regardless of his ability or inability to satisfy the requirements of adverse possession contained in § 78-12-7.1. Frederiksen
v. LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827 (Utah 1981).
Claims barred.
-Lack of possession.
Person who is not in possession of the property during the four-year period following the
acquisition of the tax title is barred from asserting his claims to the property against the
holder of the tax title where more than four
years have passed since acquisition of the tax
title. Dye v. Miller & Viele, 587 P.2d 139 (Utah
1978).
Construction and application of section.
The intention here is to provide a four-year
statute of limitations, barring claims against

tax titles, which period dates from the initiation of the tax title. Peterson v. Callister, 6
Utah 2d 359, 313 P.2d 814 (1957), affd, 8 Utah
2d 348, 334 P.2d 759 (1959).

Invalid tax title.
Even though plaintiffs tax title was invalid,
title was quieted in plaintiff where defendant
grantee holding a quitclaim deed from patentee did not occupy the property, pay taxes on it,
or attack the possession of the plaintiff within
four years from the date of plaintiffs taking
possession. Peterson v. Callister, 6 Utah 2d
359, 313 P.2d 814 (1957), affd, 8 Utah 2d 348,
334 P.2d 759 (1959).
Judgment was properly entered for defendants in a declaratory judgment action to determine rights of parties to realty possessed by
defendants under tax deed where plaintiffs had
not been in possession of the realty for more
than twelve years prior to the bringing of the
action and had not paid any taxes thereon
since 1932 and defendants held possession under an apparent claim of right adversely to
plaintiffs for more than seven years by grazing
sheep thereon, the validity of the tax deed being immaterial. Cope v. Bountiful Livestock
Co., 13 Utah 2d 20, 368 P.2d 68 (1962).
Tax title holders may avail themselves of the
special statute of limitations provided for tax
titles regardless of either the invalidity of their
tax title or their inability to establish an affirmative claim to title apart from their tax title.
Frederiksen v. LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827 (Utah
1981).
"Tax title".
-Cotenants.
Where property owned by cotenants was sold
at a tax sale and one of the cotenants purchased the property at the tax sale and received a tax deed, the cotenant did not purchase a "tax title" in the ordinary sense as the
purchase was for the benefit of all the other
cotenants, and§§ 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2 were
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not applicable in a quiet title action by the
other cotenants against the purchasing cotenant who attempted to exclude the other cotenants after the purchase. Massey v. Prothero,
664 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1983).

-Former record titleholders.
Where former record titleholders were obligated to pay the 1964 taxes on the real property but failed to do so and conveyed away all
their interest and title in the property prior to
the final or auditor's tax sale, and at such tax
sale the former titleholders appeared and paid
the delinquent taxes and purchased an auditor's tax deed, the former titleholders, by meeting their tax obligation at the tax sale, could
not acquire any title or interest in the property
beyond that which they already had, which

78-12-5.2

was no interest or title since they had conveyed
away their interest and title prior to the tax
sale; therefore, the former titleholders could
not and did not purchase a tax title at the tax
sale and were not entitled to the protection of
the tax title statutes,§§ 78-12-5.1 to 78-12-5.3.
Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974 (Utah 1982).

Validity of section.
This statute is a valid statute of limitations
designed to validate tax titles. Although Laws
1951, ch. 58 repealed parent statute of Laws
1951, ch. 19, it did not repeal ch. 19. Under
such circumstances it is not reasonable to assume that the legislature intended to repeal
Laws 1951, ch. 19. Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d
310, 283 P.2d 884 (1955) (see Compiler's Notes,
above).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Brigham Young Law Review. - Utah's
Short Statutes of Limitation for Tax Titles:
The Continuing Specter of Lyman v. National
Mortgage Bond Corp. - A Need for Remedial
Legislation, 1976 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 457.

78-12-5.2.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 84 et seq.
C.J.S. - 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 42.
Key Numbers. - Limitation of Actions e=>
19(7).

Holder of tax title defense - Proviso.

Limitations

of action or

No action or defense for the recovery or possession of real property or to
quiet title or determine the ownership thereof shall be commenced or interposed against the holder of a tax title after the expiration of four years from
the date of the sale, conveya\lce or transfer of such tax title to any county, or
directly to any other purchase thereof at any public or private tax sale and
after the expiration of one year from the date of this act. Provided, however,
that this section shall not bar any action or defense by the owner of the legal
title to such property where he or his predecessor has actually occupied or
been in actual possession of such property within four years from the commencement or interposition of such action or defense. And provided further,
that this section shall not bar any defense by a city or town, to an action by
the holder of a tax title, to the effect that such city or town holds a lien against
such property which is equal or superior to the claim of the holder of such tax
title.
History: C. 1943, 104-2-5.10, enacted by L.
1951, ch. 19, § 2.
"Date of this act". -The term "date of this
act," referred to in the first section, means the
effective date of Laws 1951, Chapter 19, i.e.,
May 8, 1951.

Cross-References. - Marketable record title, § 57-9-1 et seq.
Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq.
Tax sales, § 59-10-29 et seq.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Actual occupancy or possession by legal title holder.
-Required.
Claims barred.
-Failure
of possession.
Construction of section.
Invalid tax title.
Possession.
-Garbage dump.
-Subsurface minerals.
--Oil
pooling agreement.
Superiority of tax title.
-Quitclaim deed.
Tolling of statute.
-Previous quiet title action.

Actual occupancy or possession by legal
title holder.
-Required.
The statutory presumption created by
§ 78-12-7.1, that the legal title holder is presumed to be in possession, does not satisfy this
section's requirement of actual occupancy or
possession and does not toll the running of the
special statute of limitations for tax titles.
Frederiksen v. LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827 (Utah
1981).
Claims barred.
-Failure of possession.
In a quiet title action, where the holder of a
tax deed intervened, set out his tax deed, alleged continued occupancy and the payment of
taxes for a period of about seventeen years and
set up the limitation statute in support of his
title and where the plaintiff did not plead or
attempt to prove occupancy or payment of
taxes during or after the four years ensuing
after plaintiff obtained his tax deed, there was
no genuine issue of fact and summary judgment in favor of the intervening tax deed
holder was properly entered. Pender v. Alix, 11
Utah 2d 58, 354 P.2d 1066 (1960).
Person with a record interest in the property
who is not in possession during the four-year
period following the acquisition of the tax title
is barred from asserting his claims to the property against the holder of the tax title where
more than four years have passed since acquisition of the tax title. Dye v. Miller & Viele,
587 P.2d 139 (Utah 1978).
Construction of section.
The intention here is to provide a four-year
statute of limitations, barring claims against
tax titles, which period dates from the initiation of the tax title. Peterson v. Callister, 6
Utah 2d 359, 313 P.2d 814 (1957), atrd, 8 Utah
2d 348, 334 P.2d 759 (1959).

Invalid tax title.
Tax title holders may avail themselves of the
special statute of limitations provided for tax
titles regardless of either the invalidity of their
tax title or their inability to establish an affirmative claim to title apart from their tax title.
Frederiksen v. LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827 (Utah
1981).
Possession.
-Garbage dump.
City, which used land as garbage dump,
maintained road into the dump, and expended
money in covering refuse as needed, was in
possession of the land and entitled to judgment
quieting title. Huntington City v. Peterson, 30
Utah 2d 408, 518 P.2d 1246 (1974).

.

-Subsurface
minerals.
Plaintiffs actual possession of surface did
not constitute possession of subsurface minerals, so as to permit quiet title action under
proviso to this section, where mineral rights
had been conveyed to defendant county by tax
deed more than four years previously and
plaintiff had exercised no dominion over the
minerals. Kanawha & Hocking Coal & Coke
Co. v. Carbon County, 535 P.2d 1139 (Utah
1975).
--Oil
pooling agreement.
Oil pooling agreement whereby several landowners delegated right to an oil well operator
to tap the oil pool under all their lands with a
single well and distribute the profits among all
the landowners did not give a party to the
agreement actual possession of the mineral
rights in the land of another party so as to
enable the first party to challenge the tax title
of the land of the second party pursuant to the
proviso in this section. Dye v. Miller & Viele,
587 P.2d 139 (Utah 1978).
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Superiority of tax title.
-Quitclaim deed.
Quitclaim deed given to utility company's
grantor which failed to show that the maker
had any title to the land the deed purported to
convey other than recital that such maker was
the heir at law of the original owner did not
convey title to the utility company's grantor
and the utility company did not have any
standing to challenge the title held by later
purchaser of tax deed. State Rd. Comm'n v.
Thompson, 17 Utah 2d 412, 413 P.2d 603
(1966).

78-12-5.3

Tolling of statute.
-Previous quiet title action.
Section 78-12-40 permitted defendants attacking a tax title in a quiet title action to
prove tolling of the statute of limitations
where, within one year previous, an action in
which a similar claim had been asserted by
plaintiffs was dismissed not on the merits.
Thomas v. Braffet's Heirs, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305
P.2d 507 (1956).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Brigham Young Law Review. - Utah's
Short Statutes of Limitation for Tax Titles:
The Continuing Specter of Lyman v. National
Mortgage Bond Corp. - A Need for Remedial
Legislation, 1976 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 457.

78-12-5.3.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 72 Am. Jur. 2d State and
Local Taxation § 1031 et seq.
C.J.S. - 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 42; 85 C.J.S. Taxation § 966 et seq.
Key Numbers. - Limitation of Actions ®"
19(7); Taxation
803.

Definitions of "tax title" and "action."

(1) The term "tax title" as used in § 78-12-5.2 and § 59-2-1364, and the
related amended §§ 78-12-5, 78-12-7, and 78-12-12, means any title to real
property, whether valid or not, which has been derived through or is dependent upon any sale, conveyance, or transfer of property in the course of a
statutory proceeding for the liquidation of any tax levied against the property
whereby the property is relieved from a tax lien.
(2) The word "action" as used in these sections includes counterclaims and
cross-complaints and all civil actions wherein affirmative relief is sought.
History: C. 1943, 104-2-5.11, enacted by L.
1951, ch. 19, § 3; 1987, ch. 4, § 305.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment, effective February 6, 1987, added the
subsection designations and made a statutory
reference change.

Retrospective Operation. - Laws 1987,
ch. 4, § 307 provides that this section has retrospective operation to January 1, 1987.
Cross-References. -Tax sales,§ 59-10-29
et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Invalid tax title.
"Tax title".
-Failure to attach affidavit.

Invalid tax title.
Tax title holders may avail themselves of the
special statute of limitations provided for tax
titles regardless of either the invalidity of their
tax title or their inability to establish an affirmative claim to title apart from their tax title.
Frederiksen v. LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827 (Utah
1981).

"Tax title".
-Failure to attach affidavit.
Failure of county auditor to attach his affidavit to county assessment roll did not void auditor's tax deed to county since term "tax title,"
as defined by this section, would indicate that
Legislature intended to include within statutes
of limitation tax titles which were initiated by
tax sales the records of which would not show
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that each statutory step had been followed
with exactitude. Layton v. Holt, 22 Utah 2d
138, 449 P.2d 986 (1969).

78-12-6.

Actions or defenses founded upon title to real estate.

No cause of action, or defense or counterclaim to an action, founded upon
the title to real property or to rents or profits out of the same, shall be effectual, unless it appears that the person prosecuting the action, or interposing
the defense or counterclaim, or under whose title the action is prosecuted or
defense or counterclaim is made, or the ancestor, predecessor or grantor of
such person was seized or possessed of the property in question within seven
years before the committing of the act in respect to which such action is
prosecuted or defense or counterclaim made.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-6.

Cross-References. - Marketable record title, § 57-9-1 et seq.
Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

"Actions."
-Collection of taxes.
Adjoining landowners.
-Agreement
between.
--Adverse
possession.
-Boundary line.
-Water rights.
--Course
of conduct.
Adverse possession.
-Claim of right.
-Payment
of taxes.
Adverse right to water.
Applicability of section.
-Compensation
for taking of land.
-Easements
by prescription.
-Fraud or mistake.
-Mortgage foreclosure decree.
--Collateral
attack.
Claim barred.
-Guardian
for minors.
"Actions."
-Collection
of taxes.
Procedure to collect special improvement
taxes as provided in city ordinance was held
not to be an "action" within meaning of this
section. Petterson v. City of Ogden, 111 Utah
125, 176 P.2d 599 (194 7).
Adjoining landowners.
-Agreement
--Adverse
Title by

between.
possession.
adverse possession

cannot

be

claimed in the face of an agreement between
adjoining landowners. Warren v. Mazzuchi, 45
Utah 612, 148 P. 360 (1915).
-Boundary
line.
Where adjoining owners and their predecessors in title have occupied their lands to given
line and have treated such line as boundary
between their lands for twenty years, neither
owner can claim beyond such line. Larsen v.
Onesite, 21 Utah 38, 59 P. 234 (1899).
The owners of adjoining tracts whose true
boundary lines are unknown, in dispute or uncertain may by parol agreement establish
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boundary lines which are binding on themselves and their successors in interest. Ekberg
v. Bates, 121 Utah 123, 239 P.2d 205 (1951).
In absence of evidence that owners of adjoining property or their predecessors in interest
ever expressly agreed as to location of boundary between them, if they have occupied their
respective premises up to an open boundary
line visibly marked by monuments, fences or
buildings for a long period of time and mutually recognized it as the dividing line between
them, the law will imply an agreement fixing
the boundary as located, if it can do so consistently with the facts appearing, and will not
permit the parties or their grantees to depart
from such line. Ekberg v. Bates, 121 Utah 123,
239 P.2d 205 (1951).

-Water

rights.

--Course·
of conduct.
In dispute between adjoining landowners respecting water rights, where no rights are either established or lost by course of conduct in
particular case, statute of limitations does not
apply. Campbell v. Nunn, 78 Utah 316, 2 P.2d
899 (1931).
Adverse possession.
-Claim of right.
In action to quiet title, this section was not a
bar to any defense or counterclaim of defendants as parties in possession, where third
amended complaint showed on its face that defendants were then in possession of at least
some portion of the premises under a claim of
right and were collecting the rents, issues and
profits. Pender v. Bird, 119 Utah 91, 224 P.2d
1057 (1950).
-Payment
of taxes.
Possession of the land adverse to the legal
owner, and payment of the taxes thereon for a
period of about four years before suit to quiet
title instituted, is not the adverse possession
contemplated by this section. Keller v.
Chournos, 102 Utah 535, 133 P.2d 318 (1943).
Adverse right to water.
To acquire an adverse right to the use of
water, there must be seven years' continuous,
uninterrupted, hostile, notorious, adverse enjoyment, under claim of title, with knowledge
and acquiescence of the person having the
prior right. Accordingly, no such title can be
acquired in excess of the amount awarded by
the court's decree. Utah Power & Light Co. v.
Richmond Irrigation Co., 80 Utah 105, 13 P.2d
320 (1962).
Applicability of section.
Any person who claims title to, or an interest
in, or lien upon, any real estate may invoke aid

of statute of limitations as against claimant
whose claim is prior in time to person invoking
aid of statute, when prior claim has been
barred by statute of limitations. Boucofski v.
Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117, 26 L.R.A.
(n.s.) 898 (1909).

-Compensation
for taking of land.
This section governs an action for compensation for taking of land by public service company without plaintiffs consent and without
condemnation. Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. Oregon
Short Line R.R., 46 Utah 203, 148 P. 439
(1915), afl'd, 246 U.S. 446, 38 S. Ct. 348, 62 L.
Ed. 823 (1918).
-Easements
by prescription.
This section does not apply to·private ri,ghts
of way or to any other class of easement by
prescription. Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah
227, 26 P. 291 (1891).
-Fraud or mistake.
Grantor not in possession who sought to
quiet title to land which required cancellation
of deed on ground of fraud or mistake, held
barred by three-year statute of limitation provided by predecessor to § 78-12-26, as against
contention that it was controlled by the sevenyear limitation period of predecessor to this
section. Davidsen v. City of Salt Lake, 95 Utah
347, 81 P.2d 374, 118 A.L.R. 195 (1938).
-Mortgage

foreclosure

decree.

--Collateral
attack.
Mortgage foreclosure decree could not be collaterally attacked for mortgagee's failure to
serve proper representative of estate of deceased mortgagor, where defendants in that action defaulted, no appeal was taken and foreclosure decree had become final, and where
foreclosure record did not show such error or
defect on its face; this section afforded no defense to subsequent action to quiet title instituted by mortgagee who purchased at foreclosure sale. Zion's Ben. Bldg. Soc'y v. Geary, 112
Utah 548, 189 P.2d 964 (1948).
Claim barred.
-Guardian for minors.
Fact that seven years had not passed since
heirs had reached age of majority did not preclude running of statute of limitations so as to
bar them from intervening in quiet title action
to claim an interest as heirs where property
descending to them from their father's estate
had been distributed to a guardian who had
had possession or right to possession of that
property for more than the required seven
years. Parr v. Zions First Nat'! Bank, 13 Utah
2d 404, 375 P.2d 461 (1962).
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Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 84 et seq.
C.J.S. - 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 34 et seq.
A.L.R. - When does cause of action accrue,
for purposes of statute of limitations, against

action based upon encroachment of building or
other structure upon land of another, 12
A.L.R.3d 1265.
Key Numbers. - Limitation of Actions
18.

78-12-7.

-

Adverse
owner.

possession

Possession

presumed

in

In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof,
the person establishing a legal title to the property shall be presumed to have
been possessed thereof within the time required by law; and the occupation of
the property by any other person shall be deemed to have been under and in
subordination to the legal title, unless it appears that the property has been
held and possessed adversely to such legal title for seven years before the
commencement of the action.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-7.
Compiler's Notes. - This section is identical to former§ 104-2-7 (Code 1943) which was
repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. Section
104-2-7 was also amended by Laws 1951, ch.
19, § 1; that provision is compiled as

§ 78-12-7.1 herein. The Supreme Court held

the amendment was valid despite the repeal of
§ 104-2-7. See Notes to Decisions, below.
Cross-References. - Marketable record title, § 57-9-1 et seq.
Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Admission that third party owns land.
Adverse possession.
Applicability of section.
Boundary dispute.
Cotenants.
Exclusiveness of statutory methods.
Federal Government.
Foreclosure of mortgages.
Permissive use.
Plural wife.
Presumption of possession.
Running of statutory time limitation.
School lands.
Tax title.
Tolling statute.
Water rights.
Admission that third party owns land.
In action to recover possession of certain real
property, defended on ground of adverse possession, defendant's application to enter lands
as homestead held direct admission that legal
title to lands was in United States. Hanks v.
Lee, 57 Utah 537, !'95 P. 302 (1921).

Adverse possession.
Where grantor's use of water ditch on another's land is permissive, his grantee's possession does not become adverse without claim of
right. Yeager v. Woodruff, 17 Utah 361, 53 P.
1045 (1898).
Possession, which will create easement in
another's land by analogy to statute of limitations, must be hostile under a claim of right,

242

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
actual, open and notorious, and continuous.
Yeager v. Woodruff, 17 Utah 361, 53 P. 1045
(1898).
This section does not, in effect, presume a
grant and give the person relying upon it the
title from seven years' possession alone. The
presumption is made from the fact that the
land was held adversely; and to make the holding adverse the land must have been protected
by a substantial enclosure, or it must have
been usually cultivated or improved, or labor
or money must have been expended to irrigate
it, amounting to the sum of $5.00 per acre. And
in either case, the occupation and claim must
have been continuous for seven years, and during that time the claimant, his predecessors or
grantors, must have paid all taxes levied and
assessed upon the land according to law.
Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, 26 P.
291 (1891).
Open, notorious, uninterrupted, and peaceable possession of land under claim of right
will be presumed to have been, from its inception, adverse as to holder of legal title, although such possession has not been in its
character hostile. Toltec Ranch Co. v. Babcock,
24 Utah 183, 66 P. 876 (1901), afl'd, 191 U.S.
542, 24 S. Ct. 169, 48 L. Ed. 294 (1903).
Possession to be adverse, must not only be
under claim of right, but hostile to, and inconsistent with, possession or right of possession of
true owner. Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. Fox, 32 Utah
301, 90 P. 564, 13 L.R.A. (n.s.) 627, 125 Am. St.
R. 865 (1907).
Mere passive possession, without intending
to claim property, is insufficient, regardless of
length of time such possession continues, or
however open, notorious, or exclusive it may
have been, since it is not the mere possession
that determines rights of parties, but it is character of possession that controls. Pioneer Inv.
& Trust Co. v. Board of Educ., 35 Utah 1, 99 P.
150, 136 Am. St. R. 1016 (1909).
Possession of the land adverse to the legal
owner, and payment of the taxes thereon for a
period of about four years before suit to quiet
title instituted, is not the adverse possession
contemplated by former § 104-2-7. Keller v.
Chournos, 102 Utah 535, 133 P.2d 318 (1943).
Character of possession cannot always be determined from declarations of party in possession, but whenever possession is of such character that ownership may be inferred therefrom, then possession ordinarily may be presumed to be hostile to rights of true owner;
that is, if party places permanent structures
upon land belonging to another, and uses land
and structures the same as owner ordinarily
uses his land, then, in absence of something
showing contrary intention, claim of ownership
may be inferred in favor of party in possession.

78-12-7

Pioneer Inv. & Trust Co. v. Board of Educ., 35
Utah 1, 99 P. 150, 136 Am. St. R. 1016 (1909).
Where defendant was given possession of
portion of public street for special purpose of
maintaining flume for mill, it could only acquire perpetual right to maintain channel for
purpose of conducting water to its mill, and
could not legally claim by adverse possession
legal title to strip itself. Hague v Juab County
Mill & Elevator Co., 37 Utah 290, 107 P. 249
(1910).
Possession by one individual may be adverse
as to another individual, although held in subordination to title of Federal Government:
Toltec Ranch Co. v. Babcock, 24 Utah 183, 66
P. 876 (1901), atrd, 191 U.S. 542, 24 S. Ct. 169,
48 L. Ed. 294 (1903).

Applicability of section.
This section does not apply to private rights
of way or to any other class of easement by
prescription. Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah
227, 26 P. 291 (1891).
Boundary dispute.
In an action to quiet title where it was
proved that fence separating the litigants'
properties was off center, but had been maintained on the same line for 58 years, a boundary by acquiescence was created. Provonsha v.
Pitman, 6 Utah 2d 26, 305 P.2d 486 (1957).
Co tenants.
While "for sale" advertisement as to part of
common property by cotenants in possession
was sufficient to put other cotenants on notice
of adverse claim, sufficient time had not
elapsed therefrom to permit cotenants in possession to acquire title under theory of adverse
possession. Sperry v. Tolley, 114 Utah 303, 199
P.2d 542 (1948).
Fact that some of tenants in common have
been in exclusive possession of the common
property for more than seven years is not sufficient to show that their possession has been
adverse to other cotenants, since cotenant is
entitled to possession of entire property so long
as he does not exclude his cotenants or otherwise clearly act adversely to their rights, and,
to acquire title by adverse possession, cotenant
must in some way indicate to his cotenants
that he is claiming the property adversely to
them. Sperry v. Tolley, 114 Utah 303, 199 P.2d
542 (1948).
Conduct by a party was insufficient to support his claim of adverse possession against his
cotenant where the party paid the taxes and
preserved the title to the property, possessed
and used the property, had the reputation as
the sole owner of the property, and made an
isolated conveyance referring to an undivided
interest in all the property, rather than his actual undivided one-sixth interest, which conveyance did not constitute conduct of the most
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open and notorious character disavowing the
cotenancy. Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Utah
1982).
Repairs and improvements made by cotenants in possession to dwellings, buildings and
fences were insufficient to put other cotenants
on notice that cotenants in possession were
claiming title adversely to them, since such
acts were normally consistent with tenancy in
common and not adverse to it. Sperry v. Tolley,
114 Utah 303, 199 P.2d 542 (1948).
Fact that some of tenants in common contracted to purchase tax titles to the common
property in their own names was insufficient to
put other cotenants on notice of adverse claims
by such tenants in common, since other cotenants had right to believe that tax titles were
being purchased for their benefit and not in
opposition to them. Sperry v. Tolley, 114 Utah
303, 199 P.2d 542 (1948).

Exclusiveness of statutory methods.
Title by adverse possession can be acquired
only in accordance with the express provisions
of the statutes. The statutes require the adverse possession to be for a continuous period
of seven years, during which period the claimant in possession must have paid all taxes levied and assessed upon the land according to
law. Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105
Utah 208, 141 P.2d 160 (1943).
Statutory methods of acquiring title by adverse possession, set out in former §§ 104-2-7
to 104-2-12, were held to be exclusive. Jenkins
v. Morgan, 113 Utah 534, 196 P.2d 871 (1948).
Federal Government.
Because Utah cannot tax the United States,
it was no infirmity to a claim by the United
States of adverse possession that the government did not pay real estate taxes on the land
after acquiring what it thought was good title.
United States v. Stubbs, 776 F.2d 1472 (10th
Cir. 1985).
Foreclosure of mortgages.
Though tax deed through which defendant
claimed, because of its alleged imperfections,
and because of irregularities of tax proceedings, was inoperative to convey good title, this
did not prevent defendant from invoking aid of
statute of limitations in suit by mortgagee to
foreclose mortgage, since equitable lien acquired by payment of taxes gave defendant interest in property. Graves v. Seifried, 31 Utah
203, 87 P. 674 (1906).
In suit to foreclose mortgage, as respects extent that junior claimant may invoke statute of
limitations, if he has acquired mortgagor's equity of redemption, he may do so to full extent
of his interest and prevent senior claim from
being made effective to any extent as against
mortgaged property; if, however, he has lien
merely, and equity ofredemption is in another,

junior claimant may invoke aid of statute only
to extent of protecting own claim; if there be
surplus arising from sale of property after junior claim is satisfied, senior, which, by reason
of bar of statute, has become junior claim, is
entitled to this surplus. Boucofski v. Jacobsen,
36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117, 26 L.R.A. (n.s.) 898
(1909).
In proceeding to foreclose mortgage, neither
presence nor absence of mortgagor affects running of statute of limitations as between first
mortgagor and subsequent claimant, but has
effect only of tolling statute as between debtor
and first mortgagor. Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 36
Utah 165, 104 P. 117, 26 L.R.A. (n.s.) 898
(1909).

Permissive use.
In action to quiet title to waters of a spring,
finding of court that defendants uttered verbal
protests only against plaintiffs use of water
negatived possibility that plaintiffs
use
thereof may have been permissive. Hammond
v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 P.2d 894 (1937).
Plural wife.
A plural wife, who had lived for 46 years on
premises belonging to her husband, did not acquire title by adverse possession based on a
parol gift, where her residence was merely as a
plural wife, and her husband had himself exercised ownership and dominion over the property, paid the taxes, made and paid for improvements, made declarations consistent with
ownership, agreed to lease a part of the property shortly prior to his death, and had devised
the property by will, and she did not assert any
legal claim to the property at the time of the
distribution of her husband's estate, but acquiesced in the terms of the will. Raleigh v. Wells,
29 Utah 217, 81 P. 908, 110 Am. St. R. 689
(1905) (decided under prior law).
Presumption of possession.
Possession under or pursuant to deed was
evidence of title to all lands described in deed,
and mere fact that fence had been erected cutting off some of tract did not affect presumption as to right to possession created by statute. Cottrell v. Pickering, 32 Utah 62, 88 P.
696, 10 L.R.A. (n.s.) 404 (1907).
Presumption is that one holding legal title
has been possessed of land within time required by law, unless it appears that property
was held and possessed adversely to him for
seven years. Funk v. Anderson, 22 Utah 238,
61 P. 1006 (1900).
In an action to quiet title, where defendants
proffered evidence that they had constructed a
house and other buildings, that they had
fenced the property in question, and that the
house had been occupied as a summer house
for more than seven years prior to the action,
the trial court erred in not admitting the evi-
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dence of adverse possession. Affieck v. Morgan,
12 Utah 2d 200, 364 P.2d 663 (1961).
Under this section burden of proof is on one
claiming title by adverse possession to establish fact that use is adverse, and not on the
defendant to establish that he was in possession under his legal title for the statutory period. English v. Openshaw, 28 Utah 241, 78 P.
476 (1904); Fares v. Urban, 46 Utah 609, 151
P. 57 (1915); Spring Creek Irrigation Co. v.
Zollinger, 58 Utah 90, 197 P. 737 (1921).
Where plaintiff introduced in evidence deeds
to the disputed property but defendant proved
title by adverse possession, the plaintiffs'
prima facie case of legal title was overcome by
defendant's proof of title by adverse possession
and possession was not presumed in the plaintiff under this section. Farrer v. Johnson, 2
Utah 2d 189, 271 P.2d 462 (1954).
Where evidence to establish adverse possession is unsatisfactory and indefinite, a finding
in favor of adverse possession will be reversed.
Needham v. Salt Lake City, 7 Utah 319, 26 P.
920 (1891).
The presumption that obtains under this section that the defendant's possession was "in
subordination to the legal title," continues
until it is overcome by clear proof that defendant's possession was adverse to such title.
Sheppick v. Sheppick, 44 Utah 131, 138 P.
1169 (1914).

Running of statutory time limitation.
The adverse possession statutes require that
the statutory time limitation be triggered by
conduct which creates a cause of action. Olwell
v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982).
School lands.
Land granted to state of Utah by the Enabling Act, for support of common schools,
could not be acquired by adverse possession,
although state had sold land in controversy.
Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, 58 Utah 418, 199
P. 670 (1921), distinguished, Minersville Land
& Livestock Co. v. Staten, 7 Utah 2d 331, 325
P.2d 260 (1958).
Tax title.
Tax sale initiates new title, and any posses-
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sion that was taken by virtue of such new title
is prima facie adverse to original title. Welner
v. Stearns, 40 Utah 185, 120 P. 490, 1914C
Ann. Cas. 1175 (1911).
Tax deed, even though defective, was sufficient to give color of title. Baker v. Goodman,
57 Utah 349, 194 P. 117 (1920).
Possession under and by virtue of tax sale
certificate during period of redemption was an
admission on purchaser's part that he held
property subject to owner's right of redemption, and was not adverse to owner. Salt Lake
Inv. Co. v. Fox, 32 Utah 301, 90 P. 564, 13
L.R.A. (n.s.) 627, 125 Am. St. R. 865 (1907).
Where no purchaser appeared at May sale,
at which county was endeavoring to sell property under§ 59-10-64, and county took title as
provided thereby, county could get title by adverse possession for statutory period, if such
possession was open, hostile and adverse to
record owner's right. Bozievich v. Slechta, 109
Utah 373, 166 P.2d 239 (1946).
In action to quiet title against defendant
claiming adversely under tax deed from
county, where defendant failed to prove that it
had actually occupied premises for period of
seven years, plaintiff was entitled to presumption under this section that it had been in possession thereof within that time and that defendant's possession had been in subordination
to the legal title thereto. Valley Inv. Co. v. Los
Angeles & S.L.R.R., 119 Utah 169, 225 P.2d
722 (1950).

Tolling statute.
One claiming by adverse possession does not
arrest running of statute in his favor by commencing action to quiet title. Welner v.
Stearns, 40 Utah 185, 120 P. 490, 1914C Ann.
Cas. 1175 (1911).
Water rights.
Title to water rights may be based upon adverse user and possession. Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 P.2d 894 (1937); Wellsville
E. Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock Co., 104 Utah 448, 137 P.2d 634, rehearing denied, 104 Utah 498, 143 P.2d 278 (1943).
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Adverse possession
- Tax title.

-

Presumption

-

Proviso

In every action for the recovery or possession of real property or to quiet
title to or determine the owner thereof the person establishing a legal title to
such property shall be presumed to have been possessed thereof within the
time required by law; and the occupation of such property by any other person
shall be deemed to have been under and in subordination to the legal title,
unless it appears that such property has been held and possessed adversely to
such legal title for seven years before the commencement of such action.
Provided, however, that if in any action any party shall establish prima facie
evidence that he is the owner of any real property under a tax title held by
him and his predecessors for four years prior to the commencement of such
action and one year after the effective date of this amendment he shall be
presumed to be the owner of such property by adverse possession unless it
appears that the owner of the legal title or his predecessor has actually occupied or been in possession of such property under such title or that such tax
title owner and his predecessors have failed to pay all the taxes levied or
assessed upon such property within such four-year period.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2861;
C.L. 1917, § 6451; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
104-2-7; L. 1951, ch. 19, § 1.
Compiler's Notes. - This section reflects
the amendment by Laws 1951, ch. 19, § 1 to
§ 104-2-7 (Code 1943). Although§ 104-2-7 was
repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3, the Supreme Court held that Laws 1951, ch. 19 was
not repealed. (See Hansen v. Morris, annotated
under § 78-12-5.1, supra.) Laws 1951, ch. 58,

§ 1 enacted the successor to § 104-2-7, now
compiled as § 78-12-7.
See, also, second paragraph of Compiler's
Notes following § 78-12-5.1 for explanation of
term "effective date of this amendment."
Cross-References. - Marketable record title, § 57-9-1 et seq.
Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq.
Quiet title, Chapter 40 of Title 78.
Tax sales, § 59-10-29 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Cotenants.
Tax title.
-Adverse possession requirements.
-Payment
of taxes.
-Presumption
of ownership by legal title owner.
--Actual
possession.
Cotenants.
Before adverse possession by one tenant in
common against another can begin, the one in
possession must, either by speech or by acts of
the most open and notorious character, clearly
show that his possession is intended to exclude
the rights of the other cotenants; to do this, the
cotenant's acts must be more than simple acts
of possession and maintenance. Massey v.
Prothero, 664 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1983).
Tax title.
-Adverse
possession requirements.
Tax title holder may raise as a defense the

statute of limitations provided in § 78-12-5.1
for tax titles regardless of his ability or inability to satisfy the requirements of adverse possession contained in this section. Frederiksen
v. LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827 (Utah 1981).
-Payment
of taxes.
Redemption from a tax sale does not constitute a payment of taxes, and a tax title claimant who failed to show a payment of taxes even
though in possession for more than seven years
could not quiet title as against the record title
holders. Lyman v. National Mtg. Bond Corp., 7
Utah 2d 123, 320 P.2d 322 (1958).
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-Presumption of ownership by legal title
owner.--Actual
possession.
The statutory presumption created by this
section, that the legal title holder is presumed
to be in possession, does not satisfy

78-12-8

§§ 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2 requirement of
tual occupancy or possession for purposes
tolling the running of the special statute
limitations for tax titles. Frederiksen
LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827 (Utah 1981).

acof
of
v.
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78-12-8. Under written instrument or judgment.
Whenever it appears that the occupant, or those under whom he claims,
entered into possession of the property under claim of title, exclusive of other
right, founding such claim upon a written instrument as being a conveyance
of the property in question, or upon the decree or judgment of a competent
court, and that there has been a continued occupation and possession of the
property included in such instrument, decree or judgment, or of some part of
the property under such claim, for seven years, the property so included is
deemed to have been held adversely, except that when the property so included consists of a tract divided into lots, the possession of one lot is not
deemed a possession of any other lot of the same tract.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-8.

Cross-References. - Marketable record title, § 57-9-1 et seq.
Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Commencement of running of statute•,
-Invasion of true owner's rights.
-Minors.
--Delivery
of guardian's deed.
Cotenants.
-Exclusion.
Exclusiveness of statutory methods.
"Open" and "continuous" possession.
-Blacksmith
shop.
--Interruption.
Written instrument.
-Deed.
--Description
therein.
--Quitclaim
deed.
--Talli
deed.
-Mortgage.
-Sales contract.
--Performance
of conditions.
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of running of statute.

-Invasion
of true owner's rights.
In action for possession of land, statute of
limitations does not begin to run until true
owner's right of possession has been so invaded
as to give rise to cause of action so that where
true owner's right to possession of land had not
been so disturbed or encroached upon, statute
did not begin to run. Scott v. Hansen, 18 Utah
2d 303, 422 P.2d 525 (1966).
-Minors.
--Delivery
of guardian's deed.
Seven-year period for adverse possession
began to run upon delivery of the so-called
guardian's deed executed after the wards
attained their majority. Memmott v. Bosh, 520
P.2d 1342 (Utah 1974).
Cotenants.
-Exclusion.
This statute does not run between cotenants
unless and until there is manifested a determination on the part of one in possession to exclude the other cotenants. Memmott v. Bosh,
520 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1974).
Exclusiveness of statutory methods.
Statutory methods of acquiring title by adverse possession, set out in former §§ 104-2-7
to 104-2-12, were held to be exclusive. Jenkins
v. Morgan, 113 Utah 534, 196 P.2d 871 (1948).
"Open" and "continuous" possession.
-Blacksmith
shop.
Evidence held to show that possession of lot
by defendant as yard in connection with his
blacksmith shop was of continuous and open
character required by statute for title by possession under color of title. Bingham Livery &
Transf. Co. v McDonald, 37 Utah 457, 110 P.
56 (1910).
--Interruption.
Where defendant, in possession oflot used as
yard in connection with his blacksmith shop,
permitted teamsters, peddlers, and others who
had occasion to do so to use it as campground
when such usage did not interfere with his own
use and occupation of lot, held, occasional driving over ground used as yard in going to and
coming from barn was not interference with, or
interruption of, defendant's adverse possession.
Bingham Livery & Transf. Co. v. McDonald, 37
Utah 457, 110 P. 56 (1910).
Written instrument.
-Deed.
Under this section title by adverse possession may be obtained under deed from remainderman, which will support title by adverse
possession after life tenant's death. Mansfield
v. Neff, 43 Utah 258, 134 P. 1160 (1913).

--Description
therein.
As far as former § 104-2-8 was concerned it
was held that "the conveyance of Tract B will
not operate as a conveyance of any color of title
to land not therein described nor appropriately
mentioned in some manner as to show an intention to convey the same." Home Owners'
Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 141 P.2d
160 (1943).
--Quitclaim
deed.
Testimony of defendant claiming adverse
possession under color of title that he had received quitclaim deed executed nearly thirty
years before for certain consideration recited
and paid was sufficient to show defendant had
color of title, even though he could not recall
exact language of deed. Bingham Livery &
Transf. Co. v. McDonald, 37 Utah 457, 110 P.
56 (1910).
--Tax
deed.
Tax deed, even though defective, was sufficient to give color of title. Baker v. Goodman,
57 Utah 349, 194 P. 117 (1920).
Where defendant purchased tax deed from
county, and immediately thereafter entered
into possession of property, paid taxes on property for statutory time, made valuable improvements on property, and held property
openly and notoriously, he was entitled to have
title to property in controversy against all parties except those under disability. Baker v.
Goodman, 57 Utah 349, 194 P. 117 (1920).
Defendants were not entitled to prevail, in
suit to quiet title to particular land, on ground
of adverse possession under invalid tax deed,
where they failed to prove possession within
purview of former § 104-2-9, or that their possession was continuous, open, notorious and
exclusive, and of such character as to give notice to owner and the world that the land was
being held adversely under claim of ownership.
Day v. Steele, 111 Utah 481, 184 P.2d 216
(1947).
Defendants were entitled to declaratory
judgment to determine rights of parties to realty possessed by defendants under tax deed
where plaintiffs had not been in possession of
the realty for more than twelve years prior to
the bringing of the action and had not paid any
taxes thereon since 1932 and defendants held
possession under an apparent claim of right
adversely to plaintiffs for more than seven
years by grazing sheep thereon, the validity of
the tax deed being immaterial. Cope v. Bountiful Livestock Co., 13 Utah 2d 20, 368 P.2d 68
(1962).
-Mortgage.
Contention that mere possession and improvement of land by mortgagee, who took possession thereof before breach of any condition
by mortgagor, and with permission of mort-
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gagor, could not constitute adverse possession
until after maturity of mortgage debt, or
breach of condition of mortgage, held not applicable where defendant relied on adverse possession founded upon tax deed. Baker v. Goodman, 57 Utah 349, 194 P. 117 (1920).

-Sales contract.
Contract for sale ofland described as lands of
railroad company to which it was or should
thereafter become entitled, which provided
that upon certain payments being made and
upon issuance of patent from United States,
deed for conveyance of land would be executed
and delivered, was not "conveyance" constituting color of title, under this section. Central
Pac. Ry. v. Tarpey, 51 Utah 107, 168 P. 554, 1
A.L.R. 1319 (1917).

78-12-9

Contract to purchase is not a written instrument under which color of title can be based in
order to gain title within seven years pursuant
to this section. Memmott v. Bosh, 520 P.2d
1342 (Utah 1974).

--Performance
of conditions.
That one claiming by adverse possession
may have performed all conditions of contract
to be by him performed strictly according to its
terms does not, without an actual conveyance
in pursuance of terms of contract, entitle him
to claim adversely from time he entered into
possession, but his right to claim adversely begins only when he has performed all conditions
of contract and becomes entitled to conveyance
of property. Central Pac. Ry. v. Tarpey, 51
Utah 107, 168 P. 554, 1 A.L.R. 1319 (1917).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession § 98 et seq.

78-12-9.

What constitutes
ten instrument.

C.J.S. - 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession§ 88 et
seq.
Key Numbers. - Adverse Possession e=> 68.

adverse possession

under writ-

For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any person claiming a title founded upon a written instrument or a judgment or decree, land is
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases:
(1) where it has been usually cultivated or improved.
(2) where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.
(3) where, although not inclosed, it has been used for the supply offuel,
or of fencing timber, for the purpose of husbandry, or for pasturage or for
the ordinary use of the occupant.
(4) where a known farm or single lot has been partly improved, the
portion of such farm or lot that may have been left not cleared or not
inclosed according to the usual course and custom of the adjoining county
is deemed to have been occupied for the same length of time as the part
improved and cultivated.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-9.
- Agricultural Code,
Cross-References.
Title 4.

Marketable record title, § 57-9-1 et seq.
Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Ancient, unrecorded deed.
Applicability of section.
-Easement
by prescription.
Efficacy of section.
Evidence of adverse possession.
-Sufficient.
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Exclusiveness of statutory methods.
Grazing.
-Grazing season.
--Suitable
lands.
--Use
part of year.
-Prima facie case.
Inclosure or occupancy.
Invalid tax deed.
-Actual possession.
Notice to owner.
"Ordinary use of the occupant."
-Holding land for speculation.
-Not found.
"Substantial inclosure."
-Found.
"Usually cultivated or improved."

Ancient, unrecorded deed.
One claiming under ancient deed never recorded, and over thirty years' adverse possession of land, during which improvements were
made and taxes paid, established title as
against one claiming under deed from heirs
and administrator of grantor's estate, but
never delivered, which was based upon assumption that title was still in grantor at time
of his death, and who paid no taxes, never held
possession, and claimed no rights in land until
just prior to filing suit to quiet title. Perry v.
Perry, 67 Utah 45, 245 P. 695 (1926).
Applicability

of section.

-Easement
by prescription.
This section does not apply to private rights
of way or to any other class of easement by
prescription. It can only be applied by analogy.
Where a person opens a way for the use of his
own premises, and another person uses it also
without causing damage, the presumption is,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that
such use by the latter was permissive, and not
under claim of right. Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, 26 P. 291 (1891).
Efficacy of section.
The statute defining what shall constitute
adverse possession is of same degree of efficacy
as is the statute of frauds. Tripp v. Bagley, 74
Utah 57, 276 P. 912, 69 A.L.R. 1417 (1890).
Evidence of adverse possession.
-Sufficient.
Where plaintiffs asserted title by written instrument and adverse possession, evidence
that plaintiffs and their predecessors had paid
all taxes for over thirty years and that the
property had been occupied by the plaintiffs,
their predecessors, or tenants for commercial
purposes for a like period established hostile
and adverse use for a period beyond the statutory requirement. Michael v. Salt Lake Inv.
Co., 9 Utah 2d 370, 345 P.2d 200 (1959).
Evidence that plaintiffs in an action to quiet

title had the tract in question inclosed, along
with a larger tract, by an electrified barbed
wire fence, placed stables and other improvements thereon, pastured horses there, and paid
all taxes for a period of seven years in accordance with § 78-12-12, all the while being in
exclusive and uninterrupted possession of the
tract, clearly established good title by adverse
possession. Falconaero Enter., Inc. v. Bowers,
16 Utah 2d 202, 398 P.2d 206 (1965).

Exclusiveness of statutory methods.
Statutory methods of acquiring title by adverse possession, set out in former §§ 104-2-7
to 104-2-12, were held to be exclusive. Jenkins
v. Morgan, 113 Utah 534, 196 P.2d 871 (1948).
Grazing.
-Grazing

season.

--Suitable
lands.
The rule that title to property may be acquired by adverse possession if it is grazed by
an adverse claimant during the entire grazing
season of each year is limited to lands which
because of their character are reasonably
suited for grazing purposes only and has not
been extended by the courts to lands which can
be cultivated during the nongrazing months of
the year. Adams v. Lamicq, 118 Utah 209, 221
P.2d 1037 (1950).
--Use
part of year.
The use of an uninclosed tract for grazing
purposes for five to six months each year from
1937 until commencement of action to quiet
title in 1945 was sufficient occupancy for purpose of constituting an adverse possession by
persons claiming title under quitclaim deed
from county, as to that portion of tract which
had not been under cultivation by another
party during that period, notwithstanding that
no use was qiade of land for grazing purposes
during remaining portion of each year. Adams
v. Lamicq, 118 Utah 209, 221 P.2d 1037 (1950).
Where other requirements were met, and it
was proved that claimant, under a claim of
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ownership,
every year
lished title
Carter Oil
(1957).

occupied land three weeks out of
for grazing sheep, then he estabby adverse possession. Cooper v.
Co., 7 Utah 2d 9, 316 P.2d 320

-Prima facie case.
Plaintiffs established a prima facie case of
adverse possession concerning grazing land
where the evidence showed the plaintiffs and
their predecessors in title had grazed the land
for over eight consecutive years, had fenced
part of the property, had repaired fences and
plowed part of the property, and the plaintiffs
had paid taxes on the property for the years
1967 to 1976, when they commenced their
quiet title action. Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308
(Utah 1983).
Inclosure or occupancy.
Mere color of title alone is not sufficient; the
statute provides what constitutes adverse possession under color of title, and those requirements must be satisfied. Defendant acquires no
title by adverse possession to land outside of
his inclosure, where no part of it was inclosed
by a substantial fence, or otherwise, or occupied or used. Pacific Land & Water Co. v.
Hartsough, 50 Utah 581, 168 P. 552 (1917).
Invalid tax deed.
-Actual possession.
Under former §§ 104-2-9 and 104-2-8, in order for defendants to be entitled to prevail on
ground of adverse possession under invalid tax
deed, in suit to quiet title to particular land,
they were required to prove that they were in
actual possession of the land within meaning of
this section, and that their possession was continuous and open. Day v. Steele, 111 Utah 481,
184 P.2d 216 (1947).
Notice to owner.
Under statutes dealing with adverse possession of farm tract under written instrument,
claim of ownership by adverse possession failed
because neither mere "color of title" to property nor subjective intent to possess land
adversely to owner is sufficient to establish title by adverse possession, unless possession is
such as to give notice to owner. Scott v.
Hansen, 18 Utah 2d 303, 422 P.2d 525 (1966).
"Ordinary use of the occupant."
"Ordinary use of the occupant," within Subsection (3), means use appropriate to location
and character of the property. Day v. Steele,
111 Utah 481, 184 P.2d 216 (1947).
-Holding land for speculation.
Holding land for speculation is the purpose
for which the land is held and not use of land.
Adverse possession cannot be based on such
mere holding of the land. Pender v. Jackson,
123 Utah 501, 260 P.2d 542 (1953).
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-Not found.
Unimproved vacant lots located in business
district of city were not occupied by defendants
for their "ordinary use," within Subsection (3),
by allowing adjacent motor company to store
part of its junk thereon, by granting carnival
use of part, and by allowing commercial sign to
be placed thereon, even assuming that such
uses were appropriate to character and location of such lots, since such acts were not of
unequivocal character indicating claim of ownership and the uses did not continue for statutory period, inasmuch as motor company, as
well as carnival, also used other vacant lots in
vicinity, many persons used lots in question as
shortcuts from one street to another, and such
lots also were used by strangers without permission as camping ground. Day v. Steele, 111
Utah 481, 184 P.2d 216 (1947).
"Substantial inclosure."
-Found.
Under this section, where land claimed was
used in connection with adjoining tract, and
both were inclosed together until the adjoining
tract was put to a different use, when a partition fence was built, this constituted a "substantial inclosure." Mansfield v. Neff, 43 Utah
258, 134 P. 1160 (1913).
"Usually cultivated or improved."
In order for land to have been "usually improved" within meaning of Subsection (1),
changes made must have been of substantial
and permanent nature and of such type as
would be suitable for use to which particular
type ofland was fitted, and changes must have
been sufficient to apprise anyone that land was
being used in manner in which an owner would
so use it and not such as could be mistaken for
mere occasional trespasses. Day v. Steele, 111
Utah 481, 184 P.2d 216 (1947).
Property located in city's business district,
consisting of unimproved vacant lots covered
with greasewood brush and irregularly depressed from about one to three feet below
street level, was not "usually improved" within
meaning of Subsection (1) by slight leveling of
small portion of the property which was not
done to extent that was noticeable, by dumping
of few loads of dirt thereon which did not
change its appearance or enhance its usefulness as property upon which a business could
be located, by weeding that was done in such
manner that weeds soon flourished again, or by
placing building upon the property a few
months before institution of suit in question,
preliminary work for its placement not having
been done for statutory period, since property
was not improved in manner usual to improve
that kind and character of land for uses to
which it could be put. Day v. Steele, 111 Utah
481, 184 P.2d 216 (1947).
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Arn. Jur. 2d. - 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession § 143 et seq.
C.J.S. - 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession§ 88 et
seq.
A.L.R. - Grazing of livestock or gathering

78-12-10.

of natural crop as fulfilling traditional elements of adverse possession, 48 A.L.R.3d 818.
Key Numbers. - Adverse Possession €= 14
et seq.

Under claim not founded on written instrument
or judgment.

Where it appears that there has been an actual continued occupation ofland
under claim of title, exclusive of any other right, but not founded upon a
written instrument, judgment or decree, the land so actually occupied, and no
other, is deemed to have been held adversely.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-10.

Cross-References. - Marketable record title, § 57-9-1 et seq.
Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Adjoining owners.
-Fence.
Exclusiveness of statutory methods.
Record title.
-Adjoining area held adversely.
--Conveyance.
Adjoining owners.
-Fence.
After twenty years' occupancy of land to
fence bordering adjoining property, owner may
maintain action to prevent encroachment of
adjoining owner claiming certain land beyond
fence. Davis v. Lynham, 67 Utah 283, 247 P.
294 (1926).
Exclusiveness of statutory methods.
Statutory methods of acquiring title by adverse possession, set out in former §§ 104-2-7
to 104-2-12, were held to be exclusive. Jenkins
v. Morgan, 113 Utah 534, 196 P.2d 871 (1948).

Record title.
-Adjoining

area held adversely.

--Conveyance.
Generally, where a person holds record title
to one tract and also occupies an adjoining area
adversely, his conveyance of the land to which
he holds record title does not thereby transfer
title to land held adversely. Home Owners'
Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 141 P.2d
160 (1943).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Arn. Jur. 2d. - 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession § 137 et seq.
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C.J.S. - 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession§ 227.
Key Numbers. - Adverse Possession«= 96.
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78-12-11. What constitutes adverse possession
written instrument.

78-12-11

not under

For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by a person claiming
title, not founded upon a written instrument, judgment or decree, land is
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases only:
(1) where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.
(2) where it has been usually cultivated or improved.
(3) where labor or money has been expended upon dams, canals, embankments, aqueducts or otherwise for the purpose of irrigating such
lands amounting to the sum of $5 per acre.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-11.

Cross-References. - Marketable record title, § 57-9-1 et seq.
Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Boundary by acquiescence.
-Fence.
-Locating boundary line.
-Period of possession.
Cotenants.
-Repairs and improvements.
Efficacy of section.
Evidence.
-Insufficient.
-Sufficient.
Exclusiveness of statutory methods.
Federal land patent.
-Mining claims.
General requirements.
Grazing.
-Nonexclusive.
Prescription.
-Period of use.
Water rights.

Boundary by acquiescence.
-Fence.
Construction offence along erroneous boundary line does not constitute acquiescence of
boundary where adjacent landowner nine
years later had a survey made to establish the
true boundary. Hobson v. Panguitch Lake
Corp., 530 P.2d 792 (Utah 1975).
-Locating
boundary line.
There is no boundary by acquiescence where
owners of tract met with buyer and by use of a
hand compass purported to locate the boundary
line. Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 P.2d
792 (Utah 1975).
-Period
of possession.
Boundary by acquiescence is an equitable
concept governed by the principles of equity.

Each case is viewed in its own light and the
establishment of boundaries is predicated usually, but not always, upon a period of twenty
years or more of possession. It is unrealistic to
use the period called for in the adverse possession statute. King v. Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 135,
378 P.2d 893 (1963).

Cotenants.
-Repairs
and improvements.
Repairs and improvements made by cotenants in possession to dwellings, buildings and
fences were insufficient to put other cotenants
on notice that cotenants in possession were
claiming title adversely to them, since such
acts were normally consistent with tenancy in
common and not adverse to it. Sperry v. Tolley,
114 Utah 303, 199 P.2d 542 (1948).
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Efficacy of section.
The statute defining what shall constitute
adverse possession is of the same degree of efficacy as is the statute of frauds. Tripp v. Bagley,
74 Utah 57,276 P. 912, 69 A.L.R. 1417 (1928).
Evidence.
-Insufficient.
It is not a compliance with rule that possession of an adverse claimant must be continuous, exclusive, open, hostile, notorious, and of
such a character as to enable owner to know of
invasion of his rights, that he let vehicles
stand on uninclosed and unoccupied ground of
another, led or drove horses over it, and threw
manure and rubbish on it. D.H. Peery Estate v.
Ford, 46 Utah 436, 151 P. 59 (1915).
-Sufficient.
Maintenance of a fence, payment of taxes,
and other evidence of possession and occupation for over twenty years were sufficient to
establish ownership as against city's claim.
Gibbon~ v. Salt Lake City Corp., 6 Utah 2d
219, 310 P.2d 513 (1957).
In an action to quiet title, where defendants
proffered evidence that they had constructed a
house and other buildings, that they had
fenced the property in question, and that the
house had been occupied as a summer house
for more than seven years prior to the action,
the trial court erred in not admitting the evidence of adverse possession. Affieck v. Morgan,
12 Utah 2d 200, 364 P.2d 663 (1961).
Exclusiveness of statutory methods.
Statutory methods of acquiring title by adverse possession, set out in former §§ 104-2-7
to 104-2-12, were held to be exclusive. Jenkins
v. Morgan, 113 Utah 534, 196 P.2d 871 (1948).
One who claims title by adverse possession
not founded on written instrument must bring
himself within this section. Jenkins v. Morgan,
113 Utah 534, 196 P.2d 871 (1948).
Federal land patent.
-Mining claims.
In view of federal statute entitling one to

land patent who has been in possession of and
working mining location for limitation period
provided in state statute, one in possession for
more than twenty years, continuously working
and improving land for quarrying of limestone,
cannot be deprived of possession because land
was located as lode mining claim when it was
suitable only for placer mining, where another
subsequently and surreptitiously located and
filed placer claim covering land. Springer v.
Southern Pac. Co., 67 Utah 590, 248 P. 819
(1926).

General requirements.
Claimant could not succeed under this section even though his occupancy may have been
open, notorious, peaceable, and under claim of
right, without showing actual cultivation or
improvement, or money expended for irrigation or an inclosure. Central Pac. Ry. v.
Tarpey, 51 Utah 107, 168 P. 554, 1 A.L.R. 1319
(1917).
Grazing.
-Nonexclusive.
Defendants failed to establish occupation or
possession of certain land within limits of requirements of this section, where only evidence
of possession consisted of use by defendants of
that land for grazing of their cattle, which use
was not exclusive inasmuch as third person
used the land for same purpose to knowledge of
defendants without intervention or complaint
on their part. Jenkins v. Morgan, 113 Utah
534, 196 P.2d 871 (1948).
Prescription.
-Period of use.
Prescriptive rights to easement of way can
arise only from use and enjoyment of way for
period of twenty years. Funk v. Anderson, 22
Utah 238, 61 P. 1006 (1900).
Water rights.
Water rights may be acquired by adverse
possession, that is, by continued possession
thereof for seven years. City of Springville v.
Fullmer, 7 Utah 450, 27 P. 577 (1891).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession §§ 28 to 38.
C.J.S. - 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession§ 30 et
seq.
A.L.R. - Adverse possession based on encroachment of building or other structure, 2
A.L.R.3d 1005.
Grazing of livestock or gathering of natural

crop as fulfilling traditional elements of adverse possession, 48 A.L.R.3d 818.
Use of property by public as affecting acquisition of title by adverse possession, 56
A.L.R.3d 1182.
Key Numbers. - Adverse Possession e=> 19
to 21.
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Possession

must be continuous,

78-12-12

and taxes paid.

In no case shall adverse possession be considered established under the
provisions of any section of this code,. unless it shall be shown that the land
has been occupied and claimed for the period of seven years continuously, and
that the party, his predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which have
been levied and assessed upon such land according to law.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-12.
Meaning of "this code". - The term "this
code," referred to in this section, apparently
means the Judicial Code, i.e., this title.
Compiler's Notes. - This section is identical to former § 104-2-12 (Code 1943) which
was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. Section
104-2-12 was also amended by Laws 1951, ch.

19, § 1; that provision is compiled as
§ 78-12-12.1 herein. The Supreme Court held

the amendment was valid despite the repeal of
§ 104-2-12.
Cross-References. - Marketable record title, § 57-9-1 et seq.
Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq.
Tax sales, § 59-10-29 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

'Adverse possession.
Applicability of section.
Boundary by agreement.
Boundary dispute.
Burden of proof.
Continuous possession.
Cotenants.
Evidence.
Exclusiveness of statutory methods.
Fence.
Grantee.
Life estates.
Occupation.
Payment of taxes.
Pleadings.
Prescription.
Public domain.
Running of statutory time limitation.
Surface and mining claims.
Tacking.
Water.
Adverse possession.
Open, notorious and hostile use and possession of the property and payment of taxes
thereon, all under claim of right, will constitute adverse possession. Mansfield v. Neff, 43
Utah 258, 134 P. 1160 (1913).
Where defendant and his predecessors had
been in actual, open, and adverse possession of
land for statutory period, and for seven successive years had paid taxes thereon, and they
were inclosed, occupied, and cultivated, title
was acquired by adverse possession. Pacific
Land & Water Co. v. Hartsough, 50 Utah 581,
168 P. 552 (1917).
Where claimant under claim of ownership
went into actual possession of certain lots

which had been sold to county for unpaid taxes,
and immediately thereafter fenced Jots and
commenced to improve them, subsequently receiving deed from county, held possession was
adverse, from time of entry, as to all the world
except county. Welner v. Stearns, 40 Utah 185,
120 P. 490, 1914C Ann. Cas. 1175 (1911).
Applicability of section.
This section does not apply to rights of way
or to any other class of easement by prescription. It can only be applied by analogy.
Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, 26 P.
291 (1891).
Where one claiming by adverse possession,
before seven years necessary for such posses-
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sion had run, commenced suit to quiet title
against one claiming interest in land, held
plaintiff could avail himself of statute as
against intervener who came into action after
lapse of seven years, as grantee of defendant.
Welner v. Stearns, 40 Utah 185, 120 P. 490,
1914C Ann. Cas. 1175 (1911).

Boundary by agreement.
Boundary of land in remote mountain area,
although fenced for approximately ten years,
does not constitute a boundary by agreement;
and the fencing error should be rectified in accordance with the true survey line. Hobson v.
Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 P.2d 792 (Utah
1975).
Boundary dispute.
Where, in suit to determine disputed boundary line, defendant claimed strip in conflict by
adverse possession, but admitted that plaintiff
had· paid the taxes thereon, defendant's claim
was unsustainable. Crane v. Judge, 30 Utah
50, 83, P. 566 (1905).
Burden of proof.
Burden of proof rested on one claiming by
adverse possession to show that taxes were not
levied and assess._edif such was the fact or that
they were paid if they were levied and assessed. Central Pac. Ry. v. Tarpey, 51 Utah
107, 168 P. 554, 1 A.L.R. 1319 (1917).
An adverse claimant has the burden of
pleading and proving full compliance with the
statute, including payment of all taxes lawfully assessed or that taxes were not assessed,
or if assessed were illegally assessed. Home
Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208,
141 P.2d 160 (1943).
Continuous possession.
City's continuous possession and use of canal
for over ninety years and use of the land on
both sides thereof in the maintenance of the
canal established title by adverse possession;
possession was hostile in that it was of such a
character that ownership could be inferred
therefrom; city acquired title despite nonpayment of taxes due to the acquisition of title
prior to enactment in 1888 of statute requiring
payment of taxes as a condition of obtaining
the title to land. State Rd. Comm'n v. Cox
Corp., 29 Utah 2d 127, 506 P.2d 54 (1973).
Even though claimant occupied land for
grazing sheep only three weeks out of every
year and there was evidence that others were
on the land during the period of adverse possession, there was no break in claimant's continuous possession, since his use was for pasturage (§ 78-12-9) and since the use of the
others was not inconsistent with his possession. Cooper v. Carter Oil Co., 7 Utah 2d 9, 316
P.2d 320 (1957).
Interruption of adverse user by owner must
be actual and not merely declarations or verbal

protests, since to interrupt the continuity of
the adverse claimant's possession, there must
be a physical interruption of the adverse possession, or a suit or some unequivocal act of
ownership which interrupts the exercise of the
right claimed and being enjoyed by the adverse
claimant. Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20,
66 P.2d 894 (1937).
Interruption of adverse user must be open,
notorious, and under claim of right, such as to
manifest intention to repossess property and
dispossess occupant and be a challenge to his
right and dominion. Hammond v. Johnson, 94
Utah 20, 66 P.2d 894 (1937).
Suit by one claiming by adverse possession,
before seven years had elapsed, against railroad company for specific performance of written agreement by which he recognized and admitted legal title of company to land in question broke continuity of. adverse possession.
Central Pac. Ry. v. Tarpey, 51 Utah 107, 168 P.
554, 1 A.L.R. 1319 (1917).

Co tenants.
Fact that some of tenants in common have
been in exclusive possession of the common
property for more than seven years is not sufficient to show that their possession has been
adverse to other cotenants, since cotenant is
entitled to possession of entire property so long
as he does not exclude his cotenants or otherwise clearly act adver&ely to their rights, and,
to acquire title by adverse possession, cotenant
must in some way indicate to his cotenants
that he is claiming the property adversely to
them. Sperry v. Tolley,"114 Utah 303, 199 P.2d
542 (1948).
When the party asserting adverse possession
does so against his cotenant, the conduct he
relies upon to establish his claim must be such
that the cotenancy is disavowed by acts of the
most open and notorious character so as to give
notice of his claim to his cotenant in some clear
and unequivocal manner. Olwell v. Clark, 658
P.2d 585 (Utah 1982).
While "for sale" advertisement as to part of
common property by cotenants in possession
was sufficient to put other cotenants on notice
of adverse claim, sufficient time had not
elapsed therefrom to permit cotenants in possession to acquire title under theory of adverse
possession. Sperry v. Tolley, 114 Utah 303, 199
P.2d 542 (1948).
Conduct by a party was insufficient to support his claim of adverse possession against his
cotenant where the party paid the taxes and
preserved the title to the property, possessed
and used the property, had the reputation as
the sole owner of the property, and made an
isolated conveyance referring to an undivided
interest in all the property, rather than his actual undivided one-sixth interest, which conveyance did not constitute conduct of the most
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open and notorious character disavowing the
cotenancy. Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Utah
1982).
A tenant in common may claim title by adverse possession as against his cotenant where
he has been in continuous, open and notorious
possession of premises for twenty years, during
which time he has paid all taxes and assessments, and made valuable improvements, of
which cotenant has notice; nor is it necessary
to give actual notice thereof. McCready v.
Fredericksen, 41 Utah 388, 126 P. 316 (1912);
Mathews v. Baker, 47 Utah 532, 155 P. 427
(1916), distinguished, Rasmussen v. Sevier
Valley Canal, 48 Utah 490, 160 P. 444 (1916).
Fact that some of tenants in common contracted to purchase tax titles to the common
property in their own names was insufficient to
' put other cotenants on notice of adverse claims
by such tenants in common, since other cotenants had right to. believe that tax titles were
being purchased for their benefit and not in
opposition to them. Sperry v. Tolley, 114 Utah
303, 199 P.2d 542 (1948).

Evidence.
' Where plaintiffs asserted title by written instrument and adverse possession, evidence
that plaintiffs and their predecessors had paid
all taxes for over thirty years and that the
property had been occupied by the plaintiffs,
their predecessors, or tenants for commercial
purposes for a like period established hostile
and adverse use for a period beyond the statutory requirement. Michael v. Salt Lake Inv.
Co., 9 Utah 2d 370, 345 P.2d 200 (1959).
Exclusiveness of statutory methods.
Statutory methods of acquiring title by adverse possession, set out in former §§ 104-2-7
through 104-2-12, were held to be exclusive.
Jenkins v. Morgan, 113 Utah 534, 196 P.2d
871 (1948).
Our cases clearly indicate that unless all the
requirements of the statutes have been met,
adverse possession cannot develop into a legal
title, and payment of taxes assessed against
the land is one of the requisites for acquisition
of title by adverse possession. Home Owners'
Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 141 P.2d
160 (1943).
This provision is mandatory and must be
strictly construed, and failure to pay taxes levied and assessed for at least one year of the
seven defeated claim of title. Central Pac. Ry.
v. Tarpey, 51 Utah 107, 168 P. 554, 1 A.L.R.
1319 (1917).
The statutory method is the only one by
which title by adverse possession can be acquired in Utah, and hence title to land cannot
be acquired by prescription. Rio Grande W. Ry.
v. Salt Lake Inv. Co., 35 Utah 528, 101 P. 586
(1909). ,

78-12-12

Fence.
In action to establish title to property in
which defendant claimed title by adverse possession, evidence that his predecessors inclosed
within fence strip of land not covered by defendant's deed, and that such fence had been
maintained for long period of time, did not vest
title to such land in defendant. Peterson v.
Johnson, 84 Utah 89, 34 P.2d 697 (1934).
Grantee.
Grantee of one who had acquired title by adverse possession by complying with requirements of this and other sections of this article
need not show further adverse possession by
himself. Mawson v. Gray, 78 Utah 542, 6 P.2d
157 (1931).
Life estates.
A life tenant cannot obtain a tax title as
against those entitled to the remainder, or by
payment of taxes initiate a right to acquire title by adverse possession, so long as he is in
possession as life tenant; nor can he pass to
another a greater interest in the land than he
himself possesses. It is otherwise, however, after life tenant dies and a personal representative is appointed. Mansfield v. Neff, 43 Utah
258, 134 P. 1160 (1913).
Occupation.
The occupation of the land contemplated by
this section must be real and substantial.
Merely leaving vehicles thereon and depositing
refuse upon the land will not suffice. D.H.
Peery Estate v. Ford, 46 Utah 436, 151 P. 59
(1915).
Claimant could not succeed even though his
occupancy may have been open, notorious,
peaceable, and under claim of right, without
showing actual cultivation or improvement, or
money expended for irrigation or an inclosure.
Central Pac. Ry. v. Tarpey, 51 Utah 107, 168 P.
554, 1 A.L.R. 1319 (1917).
Payment of taxes.
If no taxes have been lawfully assessed, payment thereof is not necessary to acquisition of
title by adverse possession. Utah Copper Co. v.
Chandler, 45 Utah 85, 142 P. 1119 (1914).
Where defendant and his predecessors in interest had been in continuous possession of the
disputed property for more than seven years
prior to 1914 when taxes were first assessed
against the record owner, title by adverse possession was acquired prior to the time the
taxes were first levied and assessed. Farrer v.
Johnson, 2 Utah 2d 189, 271 P.2d 462 (1954).
Where defendant in quiet title action testified he did not know whether he had paid taxes
on disputed property, and presented no evidence of tax payment, he failed to carry his
burden of proving full statutory compliance;
thus, trial court erred in holding adverse possession as an alternative basis for quieting ti-
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tie in defendant. Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d
979 (Ut(lh 1979).
Where statutory period of adverse possession
had fully run when statute requiring payment
of taxes went into effect, title by adverse possession was complete without payment of
taxes, and it was immaterial whether taxes
were subsequently paid or not. Rydalch v. Anderson, 37 Utah 99, 107 P. 25 (1910).
Payment of taxes cannot be shown by introduction of a tax receipt that does not sufficiently describe the property to identify it.
Fares v. Urban, 46 Utah 609, 151 P. 57 (1915).
Railroad could not acquire title by adverse
possession to part oflot not owned by it and not
part of its right of way, but which was assessed
merely as part of lot distinct from assessment
of its right of way, where railroad did not pay
taxes thereon as required by this section. Rio
Grande W. Ry. v. Salt Lake Inv. Co., 35 Utah
528, 101 P. 586 (1909).
Where there was no evidence that either person claiming title by adverse possession or his
predecessors paid any taxes on disputed strip of
land, claimant failed to make out case of adverse possession. Peterson v. Johnson, 84 Utah
89, 34 P.2d 697 (1934).
Proof that defendant, who pleaded title by
adverse possession, planted vegetation, cultivated land to fence and occupied land under
claim of right could not operate to divest owner
of record title, where defendant failed to prove
payment of taxes for requisite period of seven
years or that taxes were not assessed during
years that he did not pay them. Smith v. Nelson, 114 Utah 51, 197 P.2d 132 (1948).
Defendant could not prevail in suit to quiet
title even assuming that he had acquired title
by adverse possession, where he failed to establish title of record by decree quieting title and
county assessed land to owner of record, and
land went to tax deed and county quitclaimed
to plaintiffs predecessors in interest. Smith v.
Nelson, 114 Utah 51, 197 P.2d 132 (1948).
In an action to quiet title, defendants' claim
of adverse possession was supported by proof
that the defendants had paid all the taxes on
improvements located on the land in question,
and that no taxes had been assessed on the real
property involved. Affieck v. Morgan, 12 Utah
2d 200, 364 P.2d 663 (1961).
Payment of taxes on improvements, including a house situated on the disputed tract,
rather than on the tract to which the improvements were assumed to be attached did not
constitute payment of taxes on strip of land in
controversy. Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 141 P.2d 160 (1943).
If improvements on land are assessed to a
party, it is persuasive that he paid taxes on the
ground. Houghton v. Barton, 49 Utah 611, 165
P. 4 71 (1917).

One of the purposes of the statute requiring
payment of taxes in order to establish adverse
possession is that by paying taxes on the land a
public record is made which gives notice to the
owner that his land is being claimed adversely.
This purpose cannot be fulfilled if the possessor
can wait any number of years, even up to the
necessary seven, and then pay the taxes in one
lump sum by redeeming. Bowen v. Olson, 2
Utah 2d 12, 268 P.2d 983 (1954).
Adverse possession for over thirty years,
though without payment of taxes, was sufficient to establish title as against one who
claimed under deed never delivered, who was
never in possession, paid no taxes, and claimed
no right in land until just prior to filing action
to quiet title. Perry v. Perry, 67 Utah 45, 245
P. 695 (1926).
The payment of taxes, standing alone, is insufficient to support a claim of adverse possession. Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974 (Utah
1982).
The requirement of payment of taxes is satisfied if payment is made by someone for the
claimant, and it was error to reject claimant's
evidence that another paid taxes for and was
reimbursed by the claimant. Cooper v. Carter
Oil Co., 7 Utah 2d 9, 316 P.2d 320 (1957).
Payment by the record owner or his agent of
the taxes for one or more years during the
seven-year period, prior to any payment
thereof having been made by the adverse possessor, not only extinguishes his tax liability,
but extinguishes the tax itself and effectively
interrupts the continuity of events necessary to
perfect title by adverse possession. Christensen
v. Munster, 1 Utah 2d 335, 266 P.2d 756
(1954).
In order to establish adverse possession,
claimant has burden to show not only that he
has paid taxes on property adversely claimed,
but that he paid them prior in time to any tax
payments made by record title holder for seven
consecutive years; claimant failed to meet such
burden of proof where evidence established
that he and record title holder paid taxes on
same day and there was no evidence as to
which party's payment was actually received
first. Parsons v. Anderson, 690 P.2d 535 (Utah
1984).
Possession of the land adverse to the legal
owner, and payment of the taxes thereon for a
period of about four years after taking possession under a tax deed, prior to institution of
proceedings to quiet title, is not the "adverse
possession" contemplated by this section. Keller v. Chournos, 102 Utah 535, 133 P.2d 318
(1943).
Redemption from a tax sale cannot be considered as payment of taxes within the statute.
Bowen v. Olson, 2 Utah 2d 12, 268 P.2d 983
(1954).
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Redemption from a tax sale does not constitute a payment of taxes and a tax title claimant who failed to show a payment of taxes,
even though in possession for more than seven
years, could not quiet title as against the
record title holders. Lyman v. National Mtg.
Bond Corp., 7 Utah 2d 123, 320 P.2d 322
(1958).
Title by adverse possession cannot be established unless the adverse claim is supported by
the payment of all taxes assessed against the
particular property for the statutory period.
Fares v. Urban, 46 Utah 609, 151 P. 57 (1915);
Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 P. 912, 69
A.L.R. 1417 (1928). See Coop v. George A.
Lowe Co., 71 Utah _145, 263 P. 485 (1927).
Exclusive, continuous, uninterrupted possession of property under claim of right and adverse to all world for more than seven years
held of no avail in establishing title unless
claimants paid all taxes levied and assessed
against property during period of seven years.
Huntsman v. Huntsman, 56 Utah 609, 192 P.
368 (1920).
Title by adverse possession can be acquired
only in accordance with the express provisions
of the statutes. The statutes require the adverse possession to be for a continuous period
of seven years, during which period the claimant in possession must have paid all taxes levied and assessed upon the land according to
law: Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105
Utah 208, 141 P.2d 160 (1943).
Acquisition of tax deed by person holding
property adversely held not to constitute payment of taxes under this section. Aggelos v.
Zella Min. Co., 99 Utah 417, 107 P.2d 170, 132
A.L.R. 213 (1940).
Taxes paid which were part of and included
in consideration given for tax deeds from
county did not constitute payment of taxes
within meaning of this section. Jenkins v. Morgan, 113 Utah 534, 196 P.2d 871 (1948).
Although a party in possession of property
and his predecessors have paid taxes based
only on the value of improvements on the property, if there have been no taxes levied and
assessed based on valuation of the land, the
party's adverse possession ripens into title to
the property if the other statutory elements are
shown. Park W. Village, Inc. v. Avise, 714 P.2d
1137 (Utah 1986).

Pleadings.
By his pleadings, the adverse claimant must
state all of the essential facts which constitute
compliance with the statute, including payment of taxes for the full period of seven years
or facts which show legal justification for nonpayment of taxes. Home Owners' Loan Corp. v.
Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 141 P.2d 160 (1943).
Under general allegation of ownership, either party plaintiff or defendant may prove ad-
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verse possession and payment of taxes. Utah
Copper Co. v Eckman, 4 7 Utah 165, 152 P. 178
(1915).
In action to recover possession of certain real
property, defended on ground of adverse possession, held defendant's answer was insufficient where it failed to allege that all taxes had
been paid on property for past seven years.
Hanks v. Lee, 57 Utah 537, 195 P. 302 (1921).

Prescription.
Prescriptive right in, to, or over real estate
can be acquired only after an open, continuous
and adverse use for period of twenty years.
Lund v. Wilcox, 34 Utah 205, 97 P. 33 (1908).
The payment of taxes is not required to establish an easement by prescription. Pace v.
Jerman, 684 P.2d 56 (Utah 1984).
Public domain.
One may not acquire title to any part of public domain by inclosing same within a fence or
by adverse possession. Peterson v. Johnson, 84
Utah 89, 34 P.2d 697 (1934).
Running of statutory time limitation.
Appointment of administrator did not set in
motion statute of limitations in favor of one
claiming property in estate by adverse possession where administrator was discharged without filing inventory or taking any steps to protect interest of heirs. Baker v. Goodman, 57
Utah 349, 194 P. 117 (1920).
The adverse possession statutes require that
the statutory time limitation be triggered by
conduct which creates a cause of action. Olwell
v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982).
Surface and mining claims.
Inasmuch as mining claims and surface
rights can be separately assessed for taxation
under§ 59-5-57, adverse possession can be acquired of surface rights under this section, although owner of claim paid all taxes assessed
against mining claim. Utah Copper Co. v.
Chandler, 45 Utah 85, 142 P. 1119 (1914);
Utah Copper Co. v. Eckman, 47 Utah 165, 152
P. 178 (1915).
Tacking.
Although a prior period of adverse possession may be tacked to a subsequent period of
adverse possession by a successor in interest to
meet the statutory seven-year requirement,
such tacking is not permitted when the grantor
expressly excludes from his conveyance that
portion on which incipient adverse possession
rights were established. Eddington v. Clegg,
639 P.2d 143 (Utah 1981).
Water.In order to acquire right to water by adverse
possession, use must have been, for seven
years, continuous, uninterrupted, hostile, notorious, and adverse, and, to have been adverse,
it must have been under claim of title exclu-
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sive of any other right. Center Creek Water &
Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay, 21 Utah 192, 60 P.
559 (1900).
Right of adverse possessor in water would
become fixed only after seven years' continuous, uninterrupted, hostile, notorious, adverse

enjoyment, and to have been adverse, it must
have been asserted under claim of title, with
the knowledge and acquiescence of the person
having the prior right, and must have been
uninterrupted. Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah
20, 66 P.2d 894 (1937).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Note, Boundaries by
Agreement and Acquiescence in Utah, 1975
Utah L. Rev. 221.
Journal of Energy Law and Policy. - A
primer of Utah Water Law, 5 J. Energy L. &
Pol'y 165 (1984).
Am. Jur. 2d. - 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession § 80 et seq.

78-12-12.1.

Possession
Tax title.

C.J.S. - 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession§ 210
et seq.
A.L.R. - Use of property by public as affecting acquisition of title by adverse possession,
56 A.L.R.3d 1182.
Key Numbers. - Adverse Possession
39
to 57, 86 et seq.

and payment of taxes - Proviso -

In no case shall adverse possession be established under the provisions of
this code, unless it shall be shown that the land has been occupied and
claimed for the period of seven years continuously, and that the party, his
predecessors and grantors have paid all the taxes which have been levied and
assessed upon such land according to law. Provided, however, that payment
by the holder of a tax title to real property or his predecessors, of all the taxes
levied and assessed-upon such real property after the delinquent tax sale or
transfer under which he claims for a period of not less than four years and for
not less than one year after the effective date of this amendment, shall be
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of this section in regard to the payment
of taxes necessary to establish adverse possession.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2866;
C.L. 1917, § 6456; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
104-2-12; L. 1951, ch. 19, § 1.
Meaning of "this code". - See note under
same catchline following § 78-12-12.
Compiler's Notes. - This section reflects
the amendment by Laws 1951, ch. 19, § 1 to
§ 104-2-12 (Code 1943). Although § 104-2-12
was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3, the
Supreme Court held that Laws 1951, ch. 19
was not repealed. (See Hansen v. Morris, anno-

tated under§ 78-12-5.1, supra.) Laws 1951, ch.
58, § 1 enacted the successor to § 104-2-12,
now compiled as § 78-12-12.
As to term "effective date of this amendment," referred to in the second sentence, see
the second paragraph of Compiler's Notes following § 78-12-5.1.
Cross-References. - Marketable record title, § 57-9-1 et seq.
Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq.
Tax sales, § 59-10-29 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Tax title.
-Claim of right.
--Validity
of deed.
-Payment
of taxes.
--Redemption
from taxes.
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Tax title.
-Claim

of right.

--Validity
of deed.
Judgment was properly entered for defendants in a declaratory judgment action to determine rights of parties to realty possessed by
defendants under tax deed where plaintiffs had
not been in possession of the realty for more
than twelve years prior to the bringing of the
action and had not paid any taxes thereon
since 1932 and defendants held possession under an apparent claim of right adversely to

plaintiffs for more than seven years by grazing
sheep thereon, the validity of the tax deed being immaterial. Cope v. Bountiful Livestock
Co., 13 Utah 2d 20, 368 P.2d 68 (1962).

-Payment

of taxes.

--Redemption
from taxes.
Payment of taxes is a necessary requirement
in order to establish adverse possession by a
tax title claimant, and redemption from taxes
cannot be considered as payment of taxes.
Lyman v. National Mtg. Bond Corp., 7 Utah 2d
123, 320 P.2d 322 (1957).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Brigham Young Law Review. - Utah's
,Short Statutes of Limitation for Tax Titles:
The Continuing Specter of Lyman v. National
Mortgage Bond Corp. - A Need for Remedial
Legislation, 1976 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 457.

78-12-13.

'---

Am. Jur. 2d. - 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession § 165 et seq.
C.J.S. - 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession§ 138;
85 C.J.S. Taxation §§ 984, 985.
Key Numbers. - Adverse Possession
79(4); Taxation
805(4).

Adverse possession

of public streets or ways.

No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or to any lands
held by any town, city or county, or the corporate authorities thereof, designated for public use as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public squares,
or for any other public purpose, by adverse possession thereof for any length of
time whatsoever, unless it shall affirmatively appear that such town or city or
county or the corporate authorities thereof have sold, or otherwise disposed of,
and conveyed such real estate to a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and
that for more than seven years subsequent to such conveyance the purchaser,
his grantees or successors in interest, have been in the exclusive, continuous
and adverse possession of such real estate; in which case an adverse title may
be acquired.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-13.
Cross-References. - Dedication of streets,
§ 57-5-4.

Disposal of unused rights of way,§ 27-12-97.
Highways
continue
until
abandoned,
§ 27-12-90.
Vacation of highways, § 27-12-102 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Establishment of a holding by city.
-Insufficient.
Estoppel.
-Affirmative acts.
-Denied.

Establishment

of a holding by city.

-Insufficient.
The city must have some semblance of title,
possession or right to use, and making a sur-

vey, destruction of a fence between the street
and adjoining property, and verbal assertion of
ownership by the city are not sufficient to establish a holding. Gibbons v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 6 Utah 2d 219, 310 P.2d 513 (1957).
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Estoppel.

party in contravention of statute, for small consideration, and there was no evidence that
property ever was assessed against grantee or
his successors in interest, and time element
was short and there was no replatting or
change in whole neighborhood to benefit of all
adjacent landowners, there was no ground for
estoppel in pais as against city's right to quiet
title as against parties holding under grantee
of quitclaim deed. Tooele City v. Elkington,
100 Utah 485, 116 P.2d 406 (1941).

-Affirmative acts.
There is no bar of the statute of limitations
against a city, in respect to a public street
within its boundaries; the city may, however,
be estopped by its affirmative acts to claim
land as part of a street. Wall v. Salt Lake City,
50 Utah 593, 168 P. 766 (1917).
-Denied.
Where city quitclaimed

alley to private

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession §§ 268, 269.
C.J.S. - 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 14.

78-12-14.

Possession
lord.

Key Numbers. 8(1), (2).

Adverse Possession

of tenant deemed possession

of land-

When the relation of landlord and tenant has existed between any persons,
the possession of the tenant is deemed the possession of the landlord until the
expiration of seven years from the termination of the tenancy, or, where there
has been no written lease, until the expiration of seven years from the time of
the last payment of rent, notwithstanding that such tenant may have acquired another title, or may have claimed to hold adversely to his landlord;
but such presumption cannot be made after the periods herein limited.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-14.
Cross-References. - Landlord and tenant
may be joined as parties, Rule 20(a), U.R.C.P.

Tenant does not hold under color of title
against landlord, § 57-6-4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Nonreside11ts.
-Maintaining
possessory right.
Presence on land.
-Actual occupancy.
--Inclosure
and agent.
Water rights.

Nonresidents.
-Maintaining
possessory right.
Under this section a nonresident guardian
may maintain a possessory right for his ward,
who is also a nonresident, through an agent.
Hyndman v. Stowe, 9 Utah 23, 33 P. 227
(1893).
Presence on land.
-Actual occupancy.
--Inclosure
and agent.
This section does not seem to be limited to

parties actually residing within this state, nor
does it establish a rule that where a party settles on the public domain, incloses a parcel of
land for a farm, and makes valuable improvements thereon, with the bona fide intention of
purchasing the same whenever a title could be
procured from the government, he must be constantly present on such land. Actual occupancy
may be evidenced by an inclosure, and maintained by an agent or tenant. Hyndman v.
Stowe, 9 Utah 23, 33 P. 227 (1893).
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quire water rights by adverse use. Gill v.
Malan, 29 Utah 431, 82 P. 471 (1905).

Water rights.
A tenant cannot, as against his landlord, ac-

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession§ 220 et seq.; 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord
and Tenant § 121.

78-12-15.

Possession

C.J.S. -

§ 254.

51C C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant

Key Numbers. 56(1).

Landlord and Tenant

=

not affected by descent cast.

The right of a person to the possession of real property is not impaired or
affected by a descent cast in consequence of the death of a person in possession
of such property.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-15.

Cross-References. - Intestate succession
and wills, Chapter 2 of Title 75.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession§ 157.
Key Numbers. - Adverse Possession = 78.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession § 259.

78-12-16.

Action to redeem mortgage of real property.

No action to redeem a mortgage [of] real property, with or without an
account ofrents and profits, may be brought by the mortgager, or those claiming under him, against the mortgagee in possession, or those claiming under
him, unless he or they have continuously maintained [an] adverse possession
of the mortgaged premises for seven years after breach of some condition of
the mortgage.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-16.

Cross-References. - Redemption of land
sold under foreclosure, § 78-37-6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Judgment lien.
Transfer to defraud creditors.
This section was not a bar to an action to
impress judgment lien on property, where com-

-

plaint alleged that property had been transferred to defraud creditors, and that property
was held in trust for defendant. Moulton v.
Morgan, 115 Utah 119, 202 P.2d 723 (1949).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession § 245; 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages
§ 513.
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C.J.S. - 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 865.
Key Numbers. - Mortgages=
614.

78-12-17
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Redemption

when more than one mortgagor.

If there is more than one such mortgagor, or more than one person claiming
under a mortgagor, some of whom are not entitled to maintain such an action,
under the provisions of this article, any one of them who is entitled to maintain such an action may redeem therein a divided or undivided part of the
mortgaged premises as his interest may appear, and have an accounting for a
part of the rents and profits, proportionate to his interest in the mortgaged
premises, on payment of a part of the mortgage money, bearing the same
proportion to the whole of such money as the value of his divided or undivided
interest in the premises bears to the whole of such premises.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
, Supp., 104-12-17.

Cross-References.

§ 78-37-6.

-

Right of redemption,

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession § 245.
C.J.S. - 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 865.
A.L.R. - Right of junior mortgagee, whose
mortgage covers only a part of land subject to

78-12-18.

first mortgage, to redeem pro tanto, where he
was not bound by foreclosure sale, 46 A.L.R.3d
1362.
Key Numbers. - Mortgages €=> 611.

Actions to recover estate sold by guardian.

No action for the recovery of any estate sold by a guardian can be maintained by the ward, or by any person claiming under him, unless it is commenced within three years next after the termination of the guardianship.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-18.
Cross-References. - Court's powers as to
estate and affairs of protected persons,
§§ 75-5-408, 75-5-409.

Guardian's powers and duties, §§ 75-5-209,
75-5-312.
Termination of guardian's appointment,
§ 75-5-210.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 39 Am. Jur. 2d Guardian
and Ward § 161.
C.J.S. - 39 C.J.S. Guardian and Ward
§ 177.

78-12-19.

Key Numbers. 109, 125.

Guardian and Ward

€=>

Actions to recover estate sold by executor or administrator.

No actions for the recovery of any estate sold by an executor or administrator in the course of any probate proceeding can be maintained by any heir or
other person claiming under the decedent, unless it is commenced within
three years next after such sale. An action to set aside the sale may be instituted and maintained at any time within three years from the discovery of the
fraud or other lawful grounds upon which the action 'is based.
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History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-19.
Cross-References. - Conservator's powers
in administration, § 75-5-424.

Creditor's claims, effect of statute of limitations, § 75-3-802.
Personal representative's duties and powers,
§ 75-3-701 et seq.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. - 26A C.J.S. Descent and Distribution § 86.
,
Key Numbers. - Descent and Distrib'ution
ea> 90(2).

Utah Law Review. - Recent Developments
in Utah Law, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 95, 130.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 31 Am. Jur. 2d Executors
and Administrators § 396 et seq.

78-12-20.

Minority or disability
riod.

prevents

running of pe-

The two preceding sections[§§ 78-12-18, 78-12-19) shall not apply to minors
or others under any legal disability to sue at the time when the right of action
first accrues but all such persons may commence an action within the time
prescribed ·in the next succeeding section [§ 78-12-21).
.,
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-20.

Cross-References.

§ 15-2-1.

-

Age of majority,

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 178 et seq.
C.J.S. - 54 C.J.S. Limitation of Actions
§ 216 et seq.

78-12-21.

Key Numbers. 70 et seq.

Limitation of Actions

ea>

Disabilities enumerated - Time of not reckoned.

If a person entitled to commence an action for the recovery of real property
or for the recovery of the possession of it, or to make any entry or defense,
founded on the title to real property or to rents or services out of the property,
is at the time the title first descends or accrues, either under the age of
majority or mentally incompetent, the time during which the disability continues is not a part of the time in this article limited for the commencement of
the actions or the making of the entry or defense.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-21; 1987, ch. 19, § 2.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment deleted subsection designations, substituted "mentally incompetent" for "insane" and
deleted former Subsection (3), which read "imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution
upon conviction of a criminal offense, for a
term Jess than for life" and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.
Compiler's Notes. - Laws 1987, ch. 19, § 6
provides that the amendment to this section
applies only to causes of action that arise after

April 27, 1987 and has no retroactive application.
Cross-References. - Actions other than
for recovery of realty, effect of disability,
§ 78-12-36.
Age of majority, § 15-2-1.
Definition of "insanity," § 68-3-12.
Disaffirmance
of contract
by minor,
§§ 15-2-2, 15-2-3.
Existence of disability when right of action
accrues, § 78-12-42.
Guardian ad litem for infants and incompetents, Rule 17(b), (c), U .R.C.P.
Involuntary hospitalization, § 64-7-36.
Multiple disabilities, § 78-12-43.
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ANALYSIS

Minors.
-Action to contest mortgage.
--Action
not barred.
-Administrator's
or guardian's failure to sue.
--Action
barred.
--Action
not barred.
Purchaser at tax sale.
-Right to title.

Minors.
-Action

to contest mortgage.

--Action
not barred.
In action to contest validity of mortgage and
quiet title to real property, where, at the time
the asserted mortgage was taken, certain of
the plaintiffs were minors, statute of limitations did not commence to run until the last of
these attained his majority. Forrer v. Reed, 560
P.2d 1113 (Utah 1977).
-Administrator's
sue.

or guardian's failure to

--Action
barred.
Where, before birth of intestate's posthumous son, statute of limitations had begun
to run against action by administrator to recover real property for intestate's estate, son
could not avail himself of disability of infancy
to stop running of statute. Jenkins v. Jensen,
24 Utah 108, 66 P. 773 (1901).
Ejectment by minor heirs is barred by failure
of administrator, who was also heirs' guardian,
to sue within prescribed period of limitations.
Dignan v. Nelson, 26 Utah 186, 72 P. 936
(1903).
If statute of limitations begins to run against
administrator by reason of adverse possession,
heir born thereafter cannot avail himself of
disability of infancy to stop running of statute.
Mansfield v. Neff, 43 Utah 258, 134 P. 1160
(1913).
Fact that seven years had not passed since
heirs had reached age of majority did not preclude running of statute of limitations so as to

bar them from intervening in quiet title action
to claim an interest as heirs, where property
descending to them from their father's estate,
had been distributed to a guardian who had
had possession or right to possession of that
property for more than the required seven
years. Parr v. Zions First Nat'! Bank, 13 Utah
2d 404, 375 P.2d 461 (1962).

--Action
not barred.
Rule that where administrator is barred by
lapse of time, heirs are also barred, had no application where property had been distributed
in accordance with statute, and heir seeking to
recover such property distributed to him while
he was minor within two years after he
attained majority was not barred from maintaining action, since limitation did not start to
run against plaintiff until he had attained majority under this section. Robbins v. Duggins,
61 Utah 542, 216 P. 232 (1923) (decided under
prior law), distinguished, Parr v. Zions First
Nat'! Bank, 13 Utah 2d 404, 375 P.2d 461
(1962).
Purchaser at tax sale.
-Right to title.
Where defendant purchased tax deed from
county, and immediately thereafter entered
into possession of property, paid taxes on property for statutory time, made valuable improvements on property, and held property
openly and notoriously, he was entitled to have
title to property in controversy against all parties except those under disability. Baker v.
Goodman, 57 Utah 349, 194 P. 117 (1920).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 178 et seq.
C.J.S. - 54 C.J.S. Limitation of Actions
§ 216 et seq.

Key Numbers. - Limitation of Actions e=70 et seq.
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